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SELLING ADVICE AND CREATING EXPECTATIONS: 
WHY BROKERS SHOULD BE FIDUCIARIES 
Arthur B. Laby* 
Abstract: Investors face a dizzying array of choices regarding where to invest their funds 
and increasingly rely on experts for advice. Most advice about securities is provided by 
investment advisers or broker-dealers, legal categories with little meaning to most people but 
fraught with consequences. Although advisers and brokers often perform the same function, 
advisers are subject to a strict fiduciary standard to act in their clients’ best interest while 
brokers are subject to a less rigorous standard of suitability to ensure that their 
recommendations are suitable for customers. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to harmonize the regulation of advisers and 
brokers and impose a fiduciary duty on brokers that give advice. This Article is about 
whether the SEC should exercise its authority. After explaining the historical context of the 
debate over a fiduciary standard, the Article critiques common arguments for a fiduciary 
duty, concluding that they are incomplete and do not alone justify a change in the law. The 
Article then puts forth a better justification, based on the reasonable expectations of 
investors. Reasonable expectations arise from brokers marketing their services as advisory 
and using titles, such as financial advisor and financial consultant. Reasonable expectations 
provide a stronger justification for a fiduciary standard than the conventional arguments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider an individual who, with a modest amount of money to 
invest, visits a financial services professional to decide where to place 
the funds. The investor will face a dizzying array of choices and must 
decide among stocks, bonds, mutual funds, annuities, commodities, 
insurance policies, and other investment products. Because most people 
are unable to make investment decisions on their own, the individual 
will likely turn to the professional sitting across the desk for help. The 
professional’s legal status under the federal securities laws will be of 
little importance to the investor. “Just tell me what to do,” is his likely 
sentiment. 
The professional across the desk is typically a representative of either 
a broker-dealer or an investment adviser—legal forms that are 
meaningless to most people but fraught with consequences. A broker-
dealer engages in numerous activities, such as executing trades, selling 
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securities, lending money to investors to invest on margin, maintaining 
custody of funds and securities, and advising about investment 
decisions.1 When recommending securities, a broker-dealer owes a duty 
of suitability, which is a duty to ensure that an investment 
recommendation or strategy is suitable for a particular individual at a 
particular time.2 An investment adviser, by contrast, engages primarily 
in advisory activities, including portfolio selection, asset allocation, 
portfolio management, selecting and monitoring other advisers, and 
financial planning.3 An adviser owes a fiduciary duty to act in an 
investor’s best interest, which includes a duty to avoid, or at least to 
disclose, material conflicts of interest.4 
There is a significant difference between a suitability standard and a 
fiduciary standard of conduct.5 Assume the investor in the example 
above would like to buy shares of a mutual fund that focuses on global 
technology companies. Assume further that the professional advising the 
investor is aware of six similar global technology funds with nearly 
identical performance, each of which is suitable for the investor. If the 
professional is a representative of a broker-dealer, he could consider any 
number of factors when deciding which fund to recommend, including 
the broker’s own compensation from the transaction. By contrast, if the 
professional is an investment adviser representative, he would be 
required to determine which of the six funds is in the best interest of the 
investor, taking into account which of the funds has the lowest overall 
fees and costs. Thus, although the investor is unlikely to think twice 
about legal categories, such as broker-dealer and investment adviser,6 
the differences between them have important consequences.7 
                                                     
1. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N STAFF, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT 10 (2011) [hereinafter SECTION 913 STUDY]. 
2. See infra Part I.C. 
3. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
4. See infra Part I.C. 
5. See infra Part I.C. 
6. In this Article, I generally use “e” when referring to advisers, consistent with the Investment 
Advisers Act, unless referring to broker-dealers or their registered representatives, which often refer 
to themselves as advisors, using “o” not “e.” See Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b–
2(a)(11) (2006). 
7. See Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439, 445 (2010) 
(explaining that a broker can recommend a high-load mutual fund without revealing the existence of 
a less costly comparable product). There is abundant evidence that lower fees enhance returns. See, 
e.g., Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 80 (1997) 
(“[E]xpense ratios, portfolio turnover, and load fees are significantly and negatively related to 
performance.”); D. K. Malhotra & Robert W. McLeod, An Empirical Analysis of Mutual Fund 
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An outside observer might be mystified by the disparate regulation of 
broker-dealers and investment advisers when both provide advice to 
retail customers about securities. This state of affairs did not arise 
overnight.8 For many years the line separating broker-dealers and 
investment advisers has blurred, and brokers have moved into territory 
traditionally occupied by advisers. The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC or Commission) attempted to address this move 
through an administrative rule proposed in 19999 and adopted in 2005.10 
However, the Financial Planning Association (FPA) successfully 
challenged that rule in Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC,11 reigniting 
confusion regarding the responsibilities of broker-dealers and investment 
advisers and the proper regulatory treatment of brokers that give 
advice.12 
Before the SEC was able to prepare a new rule, the financial crisis of 
2008 overtook events, and the Obama Administration embraced the 
regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers as one plank in its 
financial regulatory reform agenda.13 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) 
addressed the regulation of brokers and advisers but did not resolve the 
issue definitively.14 In the Dodd-Frank Act, the U.S. Congress required 
                                                     
Expenses, 20 J. FIN. RES. 175, 189 (1997) (concluding that investors should select no-load funds 
with no 12b-1 plan); see also Calculating Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/tools/mfcc/mfcc-int.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2012). 
8. See Certain Broker-Dealers Not Deemed to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release 
No. 42099, Advisers Act Release No. 1845, 64 Fed. Reg. 61226, 61227 (proposed Nov. 4, 1999) 
[hereinafter 1999 Proposing Release]; see also Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers – What’s in a 
Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 34 (2005); Financial Advisers Group Sues SEC Over 
Broker-Dealer Exemption, 10 NO. 20 ANDREWS DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 10 (Aug. 20, 2004). 
9. 1999 Proposing Release, supra note 8. As discussed below, this proposal was intended to 
exclude broker-dealers from application of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, not to place a 
fiduciary duty on brokers that give advice to retail customers. See infra Part I.E. 
10. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release No. 
51523, Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20424 (Apr. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Adopting 
Release]. 
11. 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Financial Planning Association is a membership 
organization for personal financial planning experts. Who We Are, FIN. PLANNING ASS’N, 
http://www.fpanet.org/AboutFPA/WhoWeAre/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).  
12. Interpretive Rule Under the Advisers Act Affecting Broker-Dealers, Advisers Act Release 
No. 2652, 72 Fed. Reg. 55126, 55127 (proposed Sept. 24, 2007). 
13. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 
AND REGULATION 71 (2009) [hereinafter TREASURY WHITE PAPER], available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
14. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 41 U.S.C. 
(Supp. IV 2010)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].  
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the SEC to conduct a study (the Section 913 Study) on whether to 
harmonize the regulation of brokers and advisers and authorized the 
Commission to impose a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers when 
providing personalized advice about securities to retail customers.15 This 
Article is about whether the SEC should exercise its authority to impose 
a fiduciary duty. 
The issue of regulatory harmonization is highly charged. In January 
2011, the five-member Commission itself split on whether to release the 
Section 913 Study.16 Since the publication of the Study, lobbying in 
Washington on this matter has been intense. Advisers generally line up 
in favor of a fiduciary obligation for brokers.17 Broker-dealers, by 
contrast, either provide tepid support or oppose a fiduciary standard 
altogether.18 The decision over whether to impose a fiduciary duty on 
                                                     
15. Id. § 913; see SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at i–ii. 
16. See Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Comm’rs, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement 
Regarding Study On Investment Advisers And Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21, 2011) (transcript available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012211klctap.htm). 
17. The Financial Planning Coalition, for example, has campaigned actively for a fiduciary 
standard. The Coalition was formed to advocate on issues related to financial planners, and it is 
composed of the Financial Planning Association, the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standard, 
Inc., and the National Association of Personal Financial Advisors. Another informal coalition, 
composed of seven groups in favor of the fiduciary standard, has advocated for harmonization 
through comment letters and other activities. The groups are Consumer Federation of America, 
Fund Democracy, AARP, Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., Financial Planning 
Association, Investment Adviser Association, and National Association of Personal Financial 
Advisors. Letter from Barbara Roper, Dir. of Investor Protection, Consumer Fed’n of Am., et al., to 
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (March 28, 2012). Two other 
organizations, the Committee for the Fiduciary Standard and the Institute for the Fiduciary 
Standard, are both urging Congress to impose a fiduciary obligation on brokers. See About Us, 
COMMITTEE FOR FIDUCIARY STANDARD, http://www.thefiduciarystandard.org/about-us (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2012); Why an Institute for the Fiduciary Standard?, INST. FOR FIDUCIARY STANDARD, 
http://www.thefiduciaryinstitute.org/about/why-an-institute (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
18. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) has stated that it 
supports a fiduciary standard but opposes a fiduciary obligation of the variety now applied to 
investment advisers. Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Man. Dir. and Gen. Counsel, SIFMA, 
to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (July 14, 2011) [hereinafter SIFMA 
Framework Letter]. SIFMA is a trade association for broker-dealer firms. Insurance industry 
representatives, many of whom are also licensed as securities brokers, have voiced strong 
opposition to a fiduciary duty. The National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors 
(NAIFA), a trade group for the insurance industry, has argued that a fiduciary standard will increase 
costs and that there is no evidence it will provide investors with additional protection. See Press 
Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. & Fin. Advisors, NAIFA President Terry K. Headley Says Suitability 
Standard of Care Serves Consumers with ‘Rules-Based, Objective’ Approach (May 11, 2011), 
available at http://www.naifa.org/newsevents/releases/20110511_rulesbased.cfm; see also Tara 
Siegel Bernard, Struggling Over a Rule for Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/business/16adviser.html?pagewanted=all. 
Laby - FINAL Word.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/1/2012  11:20 AM 
2012] SELLING ADVICE AND CREATING EXPECTATIONS 713 
 
brokers has engendered discussion in academia as well.19 Writers have 
discussed reasons to place a fiduciary duty on brokers, but they have not 
systematically analyzed the merits of the arguments used to support a 
fiduciary standard. This Article fills that gap. It assesses the arguments 
in support of a fiduciary duty, concluding that although some have merit, 
they do not by themselves justify a change. 
Although a fiduciary duty for brokers is warranted, it is not warranted 
for the reasons generally expressed. Instead, a fiduciary obligation 
should be imposed on brokers that give advice based on investors’ 
reasonable expectations. Reasonable expectations are not the same as 
empirical expectations based on survey data or other inquiries into 
epistemic expectations. Reasonable expectations are based not only on 
actual expectations, but also on normative considerations that ground a 
right. Through advertising and titles, broker-dealers hold themselves out 
as purveyors of impartial advice, which gives rise to reasonable 
expectations that they will act in a fiduciary capacity. The primary thrust 
of this Article is that these actions broadly support imposing a fiduciary 
standard. The point is not that individual brokers through advertising or 
use of titles have created individualized fiduciary contracts with 
particular investors. Rather, it is the way the industry holds itself out 
broadly that creates reasonable expectations that brokers giving advice 
will act in a fiduciary capacity. These reasonable expectations provide a 
justification for imposing a federal fiduciary duty. 
Part I of this Article provides historical background regarding the 
debate over whether to impose a fiduciary duty on brokers. The debate 
                                                     
19. A small body of literature has developed, fueled by the court’s opinion in Financial Planning 
Ass’n and the Administration’s decision to press for harmonization in financial regulatory reform. 
See generally Matthew P. Allen, A Lesson from History, Roosevelt to Obama – The Evolution of 
Broker-Dealer Regulation: From Self-Regulation, Arbitration, and Suitability to Federal 
Regulation, Litigation, and Fiduciary Duty, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1 (2010); Onnig H. 
Dombalagian, Investment Recommendations and the Essence of Duty, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1265 
(2011); Kristina A. Fausti, A Fiduciary Duty For All?, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 183 (2010); Thomas Lee 
Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties and the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 47 (2011); Thomas Lee Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient? Principles, 
Rules, and Fiduciary Duties, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 710 (2010); Steven D. Irwin, Scott A. 
Lane & Carolyn W. Mendelson, Wasn’t My Broker Always Looking Out For My Best Interests? The 
Road to Become a Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 41 (2009); Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the 
Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395 (2010); Langevoort, 
supra note 7; Nicholas S. Di Lorenzo, Note, Defining a New Punctilio of an Honor: The Best 
Interest Standard for Broker-Dealers, 92 B.U. L. REV. 291 (2012); Symposium, Papers on a 
Fiduciary Duty for Broker-Dealers, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. LAW. 119 (2010); Robert A. Prentice, 
Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of Disclosure, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1059 (2011); 
Gary A. Varnavides, The Flawed State of Broker-Dealer Regulation and the Case for an Authentic 
Federal Fiduciary Standard for Broker-Dealers, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203 (2011). 
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has a long history, starting with decisions made when the federal 
securities laws were passed in the 1930s and in 1940, and through 
developments in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. This history explains why 
different standards are imposed on broker-dealers and investment 
advisers. Part I also demonstrates that concerns animating the debate 
today are surprisingly similar to concerns that were prevalent when the 
securities laws were enacted. The concern today is that broker-dealers, 
which historically sold securities and profited when a sale was made, 
have assumed a role that causes investors to believe that brokers provide 
impartial advice. Brokers, therefore, should be regulated as advisers. In 
the 1930s, there was a similar concern that brokers with a product to sell 
could disguise themselves as impartial advisers. Regulation was urged as 
a means to separate the two groups. Understanding this parallel provides 
historical context to the modern debate over harmonization. 
Part II reviews and analyzes arguments put forth by advocates for a 
fiduciary standard. Although some of the claims overlap, the arguments 
can be delineated as follows: (i) investors are confused about the 
standards imposed on brokers and advisers, (ii) the standards currently 
imposed on brokers and advisers are inconsistent, (iii) the standards 
currently imposed on brokers are ineffective, (iv) the benefits of 
imposing a fiduciary standard on brokers outweigh the costs, and (v) 
investors expect a fiduciary standard for brokers. The first four 
arguments do not, by themselves, support a fiduciary standard; the last 
argument, investor expectations, comes closest to providing a sound 
justification, but it is not cast in a compelling manner. Thus, none of the 
conventional arguments provides a sufficient justification to adopt a 
fiduciary standard. 
Part III extends and develops the last of the five arguments discussed 
in Part II, investor expectations, and asserts that reasonable expectations 
provide a more compelling justification for change than actual 
expectations. Part III begins by reviewing three possible foundations for 
reasonable expectations: the contract terms, empirical expectations, and 
normative expectations. Part III then explains that advertisements and 
titles emphasizing advice used by many broker-dealers induce investors 
to engage brokerage firms to do business. This inducement provides a 
normative foundation for a reasonable expectation that brokers will be 
providing advice. Part III then demonstrates that a reasonable 
expectation that a broker will give advice is tantamount to a reasonable 
expectation that the broker will act in a fiduciary capacity. Part III 
concludes by discussing the implications of reasonable expectations 
under both regulatory and common law. 
The need to articulate a justification for a fiduciary standard is 
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timely.20 There is a definite trend toward the adoption of a fiduciary duty 
for brokers. This trend is evidenced by the following measures: the 
Obama Administration’s inclusion of a fiduciary standard in its 2008 and 
2009 reform agendas,21 Congressional action in the Dodd-Frank Act 
authorizing the SEC to impose a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers,22 the 
Section 913 Study, which recommended the adoption of a fiduciary 
rule,23 and statements from SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro in support of 
a fiduciary obligation.24 The Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA), the trade association for broker-dealers, has also 
agreed that a fiduciary duty should be adopted in some form.25 Most 
recently, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the self-
regulatory organization (SRO) for brokers, suggested that the suitability 
requirement entails making recommendations that are consistent with a 
customer’s best interest—a fiduciary standard—and offered guidance on 
fulfilling such a fiduciary responsibility.26 Although all roads point to the 
adoption of a fiduciary standard for brokers that give advice, the SEC 
has not yet acted. As a result, a sound justification for a fiduciary 
obligation is more important than ever. 
                                                     
20. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, A Fancy Financial Adviser Title Does Not Ensure High 
Standards, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/07/your-
money/beware-of-fancy-financial-adviser-titles.html; Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, 
Former Brokers Say JPMorgan Favored Selling Bank’s Own Funds Over Others, N.Y. TIMES, July 
2, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/ex-brokers-say-jpmorgan-favored-selling-banks-
own-funds-over-others; Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Many Regulators Put Their 
Attention on How JPMorgan Marketed its Funds, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/jpmorgan-pushed-sales-of-its-funds-even-at-clients-
expense-brokers-say; Editorial, Want to Buy a Mutual Fund?, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2012, at A22, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/opinion/want-to-buy-a-mutual-fund.html. 
21. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE 121, 125–26 (2008) [hereinafter TREASURY BLUEPRINT], available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp896.aspx; TREASURY WHITE PAPER, 
supra note 13, at 15, 71–72. 
22. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 14, § 913.  
23. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 109. 
24. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the CCOutreach 
National Seminar (Feb. 8, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/ 
spch020811mls.htm). 
25. SIFMA Framework Letter, supra note 18, at 11. 
26. FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, at 3–4 (May 2012), available at http://www.finra.org/ 
web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p126431.pdf. 
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I. DISPARATE REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
AND BROKER-DEALERS THAT PROVIDE ADVICE IS 
ROOTED IN HISTORY 
The debate over whether to place a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers 
that provide advice is rooted in the 1930s, when Congress first imposed 
federal regulation on the securities industry. Certain regulatory decisions 
from seventy-five years ago, understandably, have not withstood the test 
of time. This Part discusses the advent of the regulation of broker-
dealers and investment advisers and explains historical shifts that have 
led to the dilemma over brokers’ obligations. 
A. Early State Regulation of Brokers and Advisers Was Minimal 
Before the 1930s, there was little federal regulation of the securities 
industry. The Interstate Commerce Commission exercised some 
regulation over common carriers’ issuance of securities, but investor 
protection regulation, if it existed at all, was generally done at the state 
level.27 States regulated the securities industry in three ways.28 One type 
of regulation was securities registration or licensing, whereby securities 
sold to the public had to be registered with a state authority. A second 
type of regulation was registration and licensing of persons engaged in 
the securities business. A third type was anti-fraud regulation, whereby 
state authorities investigated and prosecuted individuals or firms that 
caused injury to state residents when marketing, selling, or advising 
about securities.29 State securities laws were known as “blue sky” laws. 
Blue sky laws permitted scrutiny over the merits of an investment as 
opposed to merely requiring disclosure of relevant information.30 
During this early era, broker-dealers and investment advisers were 
subject to state regulation.31 In 1911, Kansas was the first state to pass a 
state securities law, which included a licensing requirement applicable to 
persons in the securities business.32 Over the next two years, twenty-
three states followed by enacting some form of securities regulation.33 
                                                     
27. See RALPH F. DE BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL’S SEC: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 3–4 (1964). 
28. LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 19 (1958). 
29. Id. 
30. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 306 (6th ed. 2009). 
31. See generally H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477, at 57–64 (1939) (advisers); JOHN M. ELLIOTT, THE 
ANNOTATED BLUE SKY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1919) (brokers); ROBERT R. REED & 
LESTER H. WASHBURN, BLUE SKY LAWS: ANALYSIS AND TEXT (1921) (brokers). 
32. LOSS & COWETT, supra note 28, at 7. 
33. Id. at 10. 
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Although some states, like Kansas, required registration of securities or 
market professionals, the Investment Bankers Association (IBA), a trade 
association for the securities industry, prevented registration in the states 
that mattered most.34 In New York, for example, the IBA encouraged the 
state legislature to pass the Martin Act, which gave the Attorney General 
authority to investigate and prosecute fraud in the sale of securities, 
though registration was not required. Working with the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), the IBA resisted efforts to register broker-dealers in 
New York until 1932, well after the onset of the Great Depression.35 
During this period, there was even less regulation of investment 
advisers than broker-dealers. Before World War I, investment advice 
was typically provided by lawyers, banks, trust companies, brokers, and 
dealers, but not by dedicated investment advisory professionals.36 After 
the stock market crash of 1929, there was greater demand for advice as 
investors sought to avoid the trauma of another Great Crash. As a result, 
the dedicated profession of investment counsel (as it was once called) 
developed more rapidly during the 1930s than during previous 
decades.37 Still, even by the late 1930s, only seven states, including 
California, Connecticut, and Illinois, required adviser registration.38 
Some, such as Michigan and Rhode Island, included within the term 
“broker” or “dealer” any person who acted as investment counsel and 
advised on the purchase or sale of securities. Consequently, many 
individuals giving advice were regulated because they were considered 
brokers or dealers, not due to intentional regulation of advisers.39 
State regulation during this early period was limited in both scope and 
effectiveness. In 1933, only eight states had a dedicated securities 
commission. In most cases, securities administrators were overworked 
and underpaid bank, insurance, audit, or railroad superintendents. Many 
were short-term political appointees who lacked relevant expertise. 
Moreover, many securities offerings occurred interstate, allowing the 
parties to avoid regulation if the transaction closed in a non-blue sky 
state. Interstate offerings provided perhaps the greatest impediment to 
effective state regulation at the time.40 The advent of a national securities 
market called for national regulation, and the Great Depression was the 
                                                     
34. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 21–22 (1970). 
35. Id. at 22. 
36. H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477, at 3 (1939). 
37. Id. at 5. 
38. Id. at 31–32. 
39. Id. at 32–33. 
40. PARRISH, supra note 34, at 28–29. 
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impetus for reform. 
B. Federal Securities Regulation Was First Enacted During the Great 
Depression 
After the Great Crash of 1929, the securities markets were moribund. 
For President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, federal securities legislation 
was necessary as a moral matter as well as an economic one.41 The first 
comprehensive federal law to regulate the securities industry was the 
Securities Act of 1933, known as the Truth in Securities Act and passed 
by Congress as part of FDR’s First Hundred Days.42 The fabled authors 
of the Securities Act, Tommy Corcoran, William Landis, and Ben 
Cohen—protégés of Felix Frankfurter—rejected merit-based regulation 
and opted instead for a philosophy of full disclosure modeled on the 
English Companies Act. The Securities Act required companies offering 
and selling securities to the public to make detailed disclosures and 
register offerings with the Federal Trade Commission, which would 
initially administer the law.43 The Securities Act was signed into law on 
May 27, 1933, and federal regulation of the securities industry was 
born.44 Although the Securities Act regulated broker-dealers in their 
securities underwriting capacity,45 it did not impose comprehensive 
regulation on brokers, and it imposed no regulation on advisers. 
1. Broker-Dealer Regulation Was Enacted in 1934 
Broker-dealers were first subject to detailed federal regulation in the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. After the Securities Act was enacted, 
reformers turned their attention from the primary market, where issuers 
sell securities to raise capital, to trading in the so-called secondary 
market, where securities are traded among investors. Passage of the 
Exchange Act was far more challenging than the Securities Act. 
Regulating the secondary market required oversight of the powerful 
                                                     
41. Id. at 43. 
42. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa 
(2006)). 
43. ANTHONY J. BADGER, FDR: THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS 130–31 (2008). 
44. The Landis-Cohen Bill passed easily in the House. The Senate, however, passed a different 
version. Sam Rayburn, the powerful chairman of the House Interstate Commerce Committee, 
favored the House version. He secured the support of FDR as well as Senate Majority Leader 
Joseph Robinson, and the House version prevailed in the Senate. See id. at 132. 
45. Securities Act of 1933, ch.38, § 2(11), 48 Stat. 74, 75 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)) (defining underwriter); id. § 11(a)(5), 48 Stat. at 82 (establishing 
underwriter liability). 
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exchanges and broker-dealer firms. Moreover, although the Securities 
Act passed with relative ease, the legislative environment had changed 
by 1934. The air of crisis had evaporated, and the legislative pace had 
slowed, giving industry more time to marshal opposition against 
proposed reforms.46 Draft bills contained numerous flashpoints, such as 
the ability to set margin requirements, the role of specialists and floor 
traders, regulation of proxies, and the composition of the new SEC.47 
After months of painful compromise, the Exchange Act was enacted on 
June 6, 1934.48 
The Exchange Act set forth clear definitions for the terms “broker” 
and “dealer.” It defined a broker as a person who effects transactions in 
securities for another49 and a dealer as a person who buys and sells 
securities for one’s own account.50 The Act also required registration of 
securities exchanges and broker-dealer firms. It limited the amount of 
credit one could use to purchase securities, required periodic reporting 
for securities issues that were already registered, and prohibited 
manipulation and fraud in the purchase and sale of securities. Perhaps 
most importantly, the Exchange Act established the SEC to implement 
and enforce the securities laws.51 The first slate of SEC commissioners 
took office in July 1934, with Joseph P. Kennedy as Chairman.52 
As passed, the Exchange Act did not provide for a self-regulatory 
structure for broker-dealers. Shortly after passage, an industry 
organization for securities dealers, the Investment Bankers Conference, 
together with the SEC, sought an amendment to the Exchange Act to 
authorize the formation of a self-regulatory organization (SRO) for 
broker-dealer firms.53 The amendment passed in 1938 as the Maloney 
                                                     
46. See PARRISH, supra note 34, at 113. 
47. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 85–100 (3d ed. 2003). 
48. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78 (2006)).  
49. Id. § 78c(a)(4)(A). 
50. Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A). 
51. See generally id. 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78oo (2006). 
52. RICHARD J. WHALEN, THE FOUNDING FATHER: THE STORY OF JOSEPH P. KENNEDY 143–46 
(1993). 
53. VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 390 (1970); Paul G. 
Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (2001). 
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), part of Roosevelt’s New Deal, permitted industry 
self-regulatory groups to establish codes of conduct to eliminate unfair competitive practices, 
enforceable by the federal courts. BADGER, supra note 43, at 74; Mahoney, supra, at 22–23. The 
IBA created the Investment Bankers Code Committee and drafted a Code of Fair Competition for 
Investment Bankers approved in 1934. In 1935, the NIRA was declared unconstitutional, Schechter 
Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), but the investment banking industry continued to 
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Act, which authorized an SRO.54 Thus, as early as 1939, broker-dealers 
were subject to direct SEC regulation under the Exchange Act and 
regulation by an SRO, which was the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) at the time.55 
2. Investment Adviser Regulation Was Enacted in 1940 
Unlike the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the Investment 
Advisers Act was not a response to crisis. By 1940, when the Advisers 
Act was passed, the Great Crash was over a decade old and the country 
was well past the statistical lows of 1933, which marked the nadir of the 
Great Depression.56 Nor was the Advisers Act a response to scandal in 
the investment advisory profession. The Advisers Act instead grew out 
of study and reflection.57 
In 1935, the SEC embarked on a comprehensive analysis of 
investment trusts and investment companies, which was required by 
Congress in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Among 
the thirteen volumes comprising the study was a slim report entitled, 
Investment Counsel, Investment Management, Investment Supervisory, 
and Investment Advisory Services.58 The Commission’s jurisdiction to 
investigate advisers was incidental to its authority to study investment 
trusts and investment companies.59 The investment counsel report was 
little more than a survey of advisory firms that responded to the 
Commission’s request for information. 
The report identified two concerns bedeviling advisory firms. The 
first was that so-called “tipster” organizations were disguising 
                                                     
follow its Code of Fair Competition on a voluntary basis. Mahoney, supra, at 23. The Code 
Committee reorganized into the Investment Bankers Conference and in 1939, the Investment 
Bankers Conference reorganized into the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). 
WALLACE H. FULTON, HISTORY OF NASD 1 (undated monograph) (on file with author).  
54. Maloney Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 719, 52 Stat. 1070 (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C. 
§ 78o-3 (2006)) (adding § 15A to Securities Exchange Act). 
55. In 2007, the NASD reorganized yet again as FINRA. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 2007 
YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT: SHAPING THE FUTURE OF REGULATION 8 
(2007), available at http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/AnnualReports/index.htm. 
56. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL 
TIMES TO 1970, BICENTENNIAL EDITION, PART 1, at 126 (1975) (unemployment statistics); U.S. 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 
1970, BICENTENNIAL EDITION, PART 2, at 1004 (1975) (bond and stock prices). 
57. S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 1 (1940). 
58. H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477 (1939). 
59. Id. at 1. 
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themselves as legitimate advisory organizations.60 Certain firms 
providing advice were affiliated with investment banks or brokerage 
firms and, therefore, had a vested interest in recommending particular 
securities. Investment banks were securities merchants; they were paid 
based on the spread between their purchase price and the sale price to 
the customer. Such institutions were unable to provide objective advice. 
As one adviser stated, “[A] merchant in securities to be sold at a profit is 
primarily concerned with moving the wares he has on the shelf that he 
will make money out of, and therefore is not in a position to give 
unbiased advice, which we have stated to be the function of the 
professional investment counsel.”61 The report emphasized that an 
adviser cannot provide unbiased advice unless conflicts of interest were 
removed. This concern over biased advice presages the current debate 
over whether to place a fiduciary duty on brokers and will be revisited 
shortly. 
The second concern identified was that advisory firms had to contend 
with numerous problems in their organization and operation.62 Although 
many advisory firms did not assume custody of client securities, they 
were not prohibited from doing so. The report pointed out that those 
firms with custody had no requirements with respect to protecting client 
assets, minimum net capital, or auditing of client securities by an 
independent authority.63 
In 1940, the U.S. Senate held hearings on a bill to regulate investment 
companies and investment advisers.64 When the hearings were over, the 
Senate report identified at least two reasons for federal regulation. One 
was to protect the public from “fraud and misrepresentations of 
unscrupulous tipsters and touts,” and the other was to protect bona fide 
investment advisers from the “stigma” of associating with unscrupulous 
members of the profession.65 The Act that emerged was the product of 
compromise. The Senate report stated that the final bill resulted from 
“cooperative efforts” on the part of the industry and the SEC, and the bill 
had nearly unanimous bipartisan support.66 
                                                     
60. Id. at 28. 
61. Id. at 29. 
62. Id. at 27. 
63. Id. at 30. 
64. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Subcomm. of 
the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, Part 1, 76th Cong. 1 (1940) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 
3580]. 
65. S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 21 (1940). 
66. Id. at 1–2. When describing the legislative process, Representative Charles Wolverton 
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The Advisers Act defined “investment adviser” as “any person who, 
for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either 
directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities 
or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling 
securities.”67 The Act required registration and annual reporting, and it 
prohibited fraud perpetrated on any client or prospective client. As part 
of the prohibition on fraud, the Act proscribed advisers from trading as 
principals with their clients absent advanced written disclosure and 
consent. The Act contained few other substantive requirements and was 
considered to be little more than a compulsory census.68 It made no 
attempt to determine who could act as an adviser or evaluate their 
qualifications.69 And it did not provide for an SRO structure; the SEC 
alone would implement the statute, unless criminal enforcement was 
called for.70 
Unlike the Exchange Act, which focused on securities transactions, 
the Advisers Act focused on the relationship between an adviser and 
client. Advisers who testified before the Senate in 1940 emphasized the 
personal nature of the advisory relationship. One witness described the 
profession as “a personal-service profession [that] depends for its 
success upon a close personal and confidential relationship between the 
investment-counsel firm and its client. It requires frequent and personal 
contact of a professional nature between us and our clients. We must 
know them well.”71 Another stated, “The relationship of investment 
counsel to his client is essentially a personal one involving trust and 
confidence.”72 Even the Supreme Court has noted the “delicate fiduciary 
nature” of the investment advisory relationship.73 
                                                     
proudly observed that industry representatives were able to “sit down with the regulatory body, and, 
around the table, discuss the problems and arrive at a fair and reasonable solution of them.” 86 
CONG. REC. 9816 (1940). 
67. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b–2(a)(11) (2006).  
68. Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 64, at 48 (statement of David S. Schenker, Chief Counsel, 
SEC). 
69. Id. 
70. Criminal enforcement was part of the Advisers Act since its passage. Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 209(e), 54 Stat. 847, 853 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(d) 
(2006)). 
71. Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 64, Part 2 at 713 (statement of Charles M. O’Hearn, Vice 
President and Director, Clarke, Sinsabaugh & Co.). 
72. Id. at 719 (statement of Alexander Standish, President, Standish, Racey & McKay, Inc.). 
73. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (quoting 2 LOUIS 
LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1412 (2d ed. 1961)). 
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3. Certain Broker-Dealers Were Excluded from the Advisers Act 
As passed, the definition of investment adviser encompassed a 
broker-dealer that advised a brokerage customer. In response, Congress 
included a special exclusion from the Advisers Act for broker-dealers as 
long as two conditions were met. First, the advice must be “solely 
incidental” to the conduct of business as a broker or dealer. Second, the 
broker-dealer must receive no “special compensation” for providing 
advice.74 The Act defined neither “solely incidental” nor “special 
compensation,” although a Senate report provided guidance on the 
meaning of “special compensation.” The report clarified that the 
exclusion applied only to broker-dealers that were paid on commission.75 
If brokers were compensated in another manner, the compensation 
would be deemed special compensation, abrogating application of the 
exclusion. 
There are at least two possible explanations for the broker-dealer 
exclusion from the Advisers Act. One explanation is that it avoided 
duplicative oversight. Because brokers were already subject to SEC and 
NASD regulation under the Exchange Act, there was little need for an 
additional layer of regulation under the Advisers Act. The SEC ascribed 
this explanation to the exclusion in 2005,76 and this explanation has 
support in legislative history.77 Another explanation is that Congress was 
largely unconcerned with advice that was insignificant in amount. 
Congress, therefore, excluded advice by broker-dealers, but only if it 
was “solely incidental” to brokerage and only if the customer did not pay 
special compensation for the advice. Paying separately for advice would 
suggest the advice was not insignificant.78 The proper interpretation of 
the phrase “solely incidental”—and the correct explanation for the 
exclusion—are unsettled, but neither is important to this Article.79 A 
                                                     
74. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2006). 
75. S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 22 (1940). 
76. See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release 
No. 50980, Advisers Act Release No. 2340, 70 Fed. Reg. 2716, 2719 n.40 (proposed Jan. 6, 2005) 
[hereinafter 2005 Proposing Release]. 
77. See Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 64, Part 2 at 1008.  
78. The phrase “solely incidental” was also used to exclude lawyers, accountants, engineers, and 
teachers. Legislative history suggests that the lawyers’ exclusion was meant for advice that was 
insignificant in amount. Id. at 766 (statement of Prof. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Harvard Law School); 
see also Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before the 
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong. 90 (1940). The 
broker-dealer exclusion, therefore, might be explained the same way. 
79. Elsewhere I have given reasons why the most likely interpretation of “solely incidental” is 
“insignificant” and, therefore, why the most likely explanation for the exclusion was to permit 
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new fiduciary duty would apply to brokers even if the brokers’ advisory 
activities continue to be otherwise excluded from the Advisers Act. 
C. The Regulation of Brokers and Advisers Differs 
Differentiating between the legal standards applicable to brokers and 
advisers when they provide advice to retail customers is a challenging 
task.80 According to some sources, brokers that executed securities 
transactions as agents for their customers were considered fiduciaries. 
Both the Restatement (Second) of Agency and the Restatement (Third) of 
Agency make plain that an agency relationship is fiduciary.81 In a 1936 
report discussing the roles of brokers and dealers, the SEC wrote that the 
relationship between a broker and a customer is fiduciary in nature and 
consistent with obligations imposed on other agents.82 
Notwithstanding early statements by the SEC regarding brokers’ 
fiduciary duties, courts have been inconsistent regarding whether 
brokers are fiduciaries.83 Today, the consensus view is that brokers are 
subject to a standard of suitability whereas advisers are subject to a 
higher fiduciary standard.84 There is a significant difference between the 
                                                     
advice that was insignificant in amount. See Laby, supra note 19, at 419–20 (citing historical 
sources). Although the proper interpretation of the phrase is important to the SEC and the courts as 
they apply the exclusion, it is not important for the argument in this Article justifying a fiduciary 
duty for brokers that give advice. 
80. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 443–44. 
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 
(2006). 
82. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE 
COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER xiv (1936). Dealers trade 
securities with customers from the dealers’ own accounts and, therefore, they are not agents in the 
same sense as brokers. Notwithstanding the distinction between brokers and dealers, the SEC has 
invoked the “shingle theory” in dealer cases, prohibiting conduct such as charging excessive mark-
ups. See Hughes v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943). Although the shingle theory was first applied 
in excessive mark-up cases, it is not limited to those cases. HAZEN, supra note 30, at 608. Under the 
shingle theory, a broker implicitly represents, by figuratively hanging out a shingle, that it will 
conduct its business in an equitable and professional manner. Id. at 607. 
83. See, e.g., SEC v. Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d 459, 499 (D.N.J. 2008) (holding that the “weight 
of the authority” is that a broker owes a fiduciary duty when a brokerage account is discretionary); 
Duffy v. Cavalier, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1517, 1536 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]here is in all cases a 
fiduciary duty owed by a stockbroker to his or her customers; the scope of this duty depends on the 
specific facts and circumstances presented in a given case.”) (emphasis in original). The 
inconsistency is exacerbated by several factors, such as a dearth of litigated cases (most brokerage 
disputes are arbitrated), the contractual nature of the duties imposed, and substantial variations in 
state law. Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 55 
VILL. L. REV. 701, 704–16 (2010). 
84. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at iii–iv; ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND 
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 10 (2008) [hereinafter 
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brokers’ suitability rule and the advisers’ fiduciary standard. The 
suitability rule requires that a broker-dealer have a reasonable basis to 
believe a recommendation or investment strategy is suitable for a 
customer based on information the broker must obtain through 
reasonable diligence.85 A fiduciary standard is far more exacting. A 
fiduciary standard is a “best interest” standard. Under a fiduciary 
standard it is not sufficient to determine whether advice is suitable, 
rather the adviser must act in the client’s best interest.86 Fiduciaries are 
subject to a distinctive duty of loyalty,87 which, absent disclosure, 
prohibits conflicts of interest when the fiduciary’s personal interest 
conflicts with the principal’s interest,88 and conflicts of duty when the 
interests of two or more principals conflict with one another.89 
According to SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,90 the leading 
Supreme Court case applying the Advisers Act, an adviser has a duty of 
utmost good faith, a duty of full and fair disclosure of all material facts, 
and a duty to use reasonable care to avoid misleading clients.91 There is 
                                                     
RAND REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf; Jane 
J. Kim & Aaron Lucchetti, Big Changes in Store for Brokers in Obama’s Oversight Overhaul, 
WALL ST. J., June 19, 2009, at C1; David Serchuk, Suitability: Where Brokers Fail, FORBES, June 
24, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/23/suitability-standards-fiduciary-intelligent-investing-
brokers.html. In certain circumstances, brokers are held to a higher standard. For example, when a 
broker has discretion over an account, the broker owes a fiduciary duty. U.S. v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 
98 (2d Cir. 2006) (a fiduciary duty is most commonly found when a broker has discretionary 
authority over an account); Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 499. Discretion is authority akin to a 
power of attorney to trade without a customer’s prior approval. Moreover, individual facts and 
circumstances can change the rule. If a relationship of trust and confidence has developed between 
the parties, a court may impose a fiduciary obligation. The classic case is Arleen W. Hughes, 27 
S.E.C. 629 (1948), aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (noting that 
fiduciary duties are imposed on brokers who place themselves in a position of trust and confidence). 
85. FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-02, at 2 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.finra.org/Industry/ 
Regulation/Notices/2011/P122779. 
86. The Advisers Act contains a general antifraud provision, which courts have interpreted to 
impose a federal fiduciary duty on advisers. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 
(1977) (stating that Congress intended section 206 of the Advisers Act, the antifraud provision, to 
establish “federal fiduciary standards” for advisers); see also SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 146 
(1st Cir. 2008) (“Section 206 imposes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers to act at all times in 
the best interest of the fund and its investors . . . .”), reh’g granted & opinion withdrawn, 573 F.3d 
54 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Lay, 568 F. Supp. 2d 791, 812 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (an adviser 
must “act in good faith and in the best interests of its client”). 
87. See Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049 (2007).  
88. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989). 
89. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. 
L. REV. 75 (2004); Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
1867 (2010). 
90. 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
91. Id. at 194 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 534–35 (2d ed. 
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no analog to the Capital Gains case for broker-dealers. 
Let us review the relatively stable state of affairs in the mid-twentieth 
century as to the roles and regulation of brokers and advisers as 
compared to the uncertainty and inconsistency of today. At that time, 
brokers performed their standard functions of executing trades, selling 
securities, making loans, maintaining custody of client funds and 
securities, arranging for delivery of certificates, performing record-
keeping functions, and providing advice incidental to the performance of 
brokerage services.92 They were generally paid on commission, and they 
were regulated under the Securities Exchange Act, subject to a duty of 
suitability enforced by the SEC and FINRA.93 Investment advisers 
generally limited themselves to providing investment advice, including 
portfolio selection, asset allocation, portfolio management, selection of 
other advisers, and financial planning. They typically charged an asset-
based fee, and they were regulated under the Investment Advisers Act, 
subject to a fiduciary standard of conduct enforced by the SEC.94 Some 
firms were dual registrants, registered as both broker-dealers and 
investment advisers. In those cases, the SEC regulated the firms on an 
account-by-account basis.95 The elegance of this regulatory scheme, 
however, would not last. During the 1970s, changes in the securities 
industry called into question the adequacy and logic of the regulatory 
scheme constructed forty years earlier. 
D. Changes in the Securities Industry Disrupted the Coherency of 
Broker and Adviser Regulation 
Beginning in 1975, the financial services industry underwent rapid 
                                                     
1955) and 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 541 (1956)). Advisers 
must disclose material information, including conflicts of interest, and information about fees, 
recommendations, and disciplinary information about the advisory firm and firm personnel. 
Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers and Legislative Proposals to 
Improve Investment Adviser Oversight, Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t 
Sponsored Enter., 112th Cong. 9 (2011) (statement of David G. Tittsworth, Executive Director and 
Executive Vice President, Investment Adviser Association), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=258252. 
92. See 2005 Proposing Release, supra note 76, at 2719–20. 
93. Brokers were also subject to liability in private actions, generally subject to arbitration in 
accordance with pre-dispute arbitration agreements signed by most investors. See generally Jill I. 
Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors’ Views 
of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349 (2008). 
94. There were few private actions brought under the Advisers Act because the Supreme Court 
ruled in 1979 that there is only a very limited private right of action under the Advisers Act. 
Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979). 
95. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 20,440 n.165. 
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change, leading to today’s dilemma over whether to harmonize the 
regulation of brokers and advisers. Some of the changes were related to 
brokers’ compensation; others were related to marketing and advertising. 
In both cases, the events challenged the theory that brokers offered 
advice “solely incidental” to brokerage and received no “special 
compensation” for the advice. 
1. The Elimination of Fixed Commissions Resulted in Two-Tier 
Pricing 
For many years brokerage commissions in the United States were 
fixed by government fiat.96 The system of fixed commissions, in place 
since 1792, was advantageous to broker-dealer firms. For example, in 
the years 1961 to 1968, fixed commissions resulted in a six-fold increase 
in income for brokerage firms.97 The system of fixed commissions, 
however, officially ended on May 1, 1975—known as May Day—when 
the SEC prohibited any exchange from requiring members to charge 
fixed rates.98 Although it is unlikely that anyone noticed at the time, 
commission rate deregulation launched a series of events that called into 
question the ability of broker-dealers to take advantage of the broker 
exclusion in the Advisers Act. 
Deregulation led to rapidly declining rates and the advent of discount 
brokerage for customers who preferred lower commissions over the 
amenities of full service brokerage.99 For example, in September 1975, 
Charles Schwab opened its first branch office in Sacramento, 
California.100 Established brokerage firms, not about to cede the discount 
market to Schwab, followed its lead.101 Several began to offer two tiers 
of service: a discount brokerage tier, which was effectively “execution 
only,” and a full service tier, which included advice. Two-tier pricing 
jeopardized application of the broker exclusion. Recall that a broker 
could not take advantage of the exclusion if it received special 
                                                     
96. SELIGMAN, supra note 47, at 301–02.  
97. Id. at 411; see also Janice M. Traflet & Michael P. Coyne, Ending a NYSE Tradition: The 
1975 Unraveling of Brokers’ Fixed Commissions and Its Long Term Impact on Financial 
Advertising, 25 ESSAYS IN ECON. & BUS. HIS. 131, 132 (2007). 
98. See generally MARSHALL E. BLUME ET AL., REVOLUTION ON WALL STREET: THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF THE NYSE 128–42 (1993). 
99. Traflet & Coyne, supra note 97, at 136. 
100. See History, CHARLES SCHWAB CORP., http://www.aboutschwab.com/about/ 
schwab_history (last visited Aug. 17, 2012). 
101. Traflet & Coyne, supra note 97, at 138.  
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compensation for advice.102 If a broker offered one fee for “execution-
only” service and a higher fee for full service, the difference between the 
two fees might be attributable to advice, vitiating application of the 
exclusion.103 
2. Certain Broker-Dealers Began to Charge Asset-Based Fees 
The advent of a two-tier pricing model was not the only development 
that endangered application of the broker exclusion. In the 1990s, many 
brokers migrated from charging commissions to charging asset-based 
fees. This migration had its own history, propelled by Arthur Levitt, Jr., 
SEC Chairman from 1993 until 2001. Levitt’s roots were in the 
brokerage industry. In 1963, he joined Carter, Berlind & Weill, and 
eventually became President of its successor firm, Shearson Hayden 
Stone.104 Levitt also served as an American Stock Exchange governor 
and was its president from 1978 to 1989.105 Levitt understood as well as 
anyone the conflicts of interest inherent in broker-dealer compensation. 
In fact, he had previously nettled some of his partners by calling on 
brokers to be paid based on client returns as opposed to commissions.106 
Years later, broker compensation remained one of Levitt’s priorities. 
In a 1994 speech before the NASD, he criticized the broker who “churns 
and burns a client and then bounces to the next firm.”107 Levitt 
applauded creative ideas being tested in the industry and noted that some 
firms offered investors a choice between paying commissions or an 
annual fee.108 Levitt welcomed such innovation and announced that the 
SEC would take a “fresh look” at compensation.109 
To that end, Levitt established a Committee on Compensation 
Practices, led by Daniel Tully, then Chairman and CEO of Merrill 
Lynch, to examine compensation and incentive practices. The 
Committee’s report (The Tully Report) concluded that at least a portion 
of a registered representative’s compensation should be based on the 
                                                     
102. See supra Part I.B.3. 
103. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 20,448. 
104. SELIGMAN, supra note 47, at 626. 
105. Id. at 627. 
106. ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 7 (2002). 
107. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (May 19, 1994) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
speecharchive/1994/spch005.txt). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
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amount of assets held in the account so that the broker would be paid 
even if his advice were to “do nothing.”110 The Tully Report’s 
recommendations persuaded several firms to begin offering fee-based 
brokerage accounts.111 The SEC understood that some brokers would be 
reluctant to offer fee-based services because receiving non-commission-
based compensation could abrogate application of the broker 
exclusion.112 The twin developments of two-tier pricing and asset-based 
fees applied pressure on the legacy application of the broker exclusion’s 
“special compensation” prong and necessitated a solution.113 
3. The Focus of Brokerage Services Moved from Execution to Advice 
Stock brokerage looked very different in the 1990s than it did in the 
1930s and 1940s.114 In the 1930s, order execution was a complicated 
process.115 Orders to buy and sell securities were first communicated to 
the exchange floor. A floor broker would then carry orders to a specialist 
who made a market in a given security. For liquid stocks, a floor broker 
would match orders with another floor broker standing at the specialist’s 
post, or against an order previously entered in the specialist’s book. If an 
order could not be matched, the specialist might act as a dealer and trade 
out of his own account to maintain liquidity. The floor broker could also 
enter a limit order in the specialist’s book to be executed at a specified 
price.116 One contemporaneous source referred to the “skill, care, and 
probity” by which execution of orders was accomplished.117 
The broker’s advisory function, by contrast, was of less importance.118 
When the Advisers Act was enacted, broker-dealers employed salesmen, 
who, in many cases, lacked the expertise to perform a true advisory 
                                                     
110. DANIEL P. TULLY ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES (Apr. 
10, 1995), available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/bkrcomp.txt.  
111. 1999 Proposing Release, supra note 8, at 61,228. 
112. Id.  
113. Id. 
114. Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving 
Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 655 (1995) (noting that “to 
modern eyes, the trading mechanisms of the early 1930s were quite primitive”). 
115. Mildred Adams, A Portrait of the Wall Street Broker, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1933, at SM8 
(explaining that the process of brokerage is more complex than imagined). 
116. SELIGMAN, supra note 47, at 487. 
117. RUDOLPH L. WEISSMAN, THE NEW WALL STREET 6 (1939). 
118. This state of affairs where brokers’ advisory role was of secondary importance was itself a 
shift from the late 1800s, when brokers performed a true advisory function. See ROBERT SOBEL, 
INSIDE WALL STREET 100 (Beard Books 2000) (1977). That older history, however, is not relevant 
to this Article. 
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function. Securities salesmen typically made a decision early in their 
careers to concentrate on either research analysis or customer contact, 
but not both.119 Although salesmen dispensed some advice, they 
generally only did so by passing along information from the research 
department or other partners at the firm.120 Many securities salesmen 
were so-called “customers’ men.” Customers’ men functioned much like 
order clerks, accepting orders from customers, transmitting them for 
execution, and reporting back to the customer once the execution was 
complete.121 Although brokers did provide advice to customers before 
the mid-twentieth century, execution was the main task. The idea that 
advice could be “solely incidental” to brokerage was befitting of the 
time. 
Developments in the ensuing decades tilted the balance of brokers’ 
activity away from execution and toward advice. The birth of electronic 
markets and the development of electronic trading automated much of 
the day-to-day enterprise of transaction execution without the use of 
specialists, floor brokers, runners, and messengers.122 Electronic trading 
eased the difficulties of execution and simultaneously increased the 
speed by which information could be communicated, making timely 
information and analysis a vital commodity. As securities execution 
receded in importance, brokers enhanced their value by providing high 
quality advice. In today’s market, advice is what investors value most.123 
As early as 1991, broker-dealers began to explicitly tell customers that 
they should consider the broker-dealer registered representative more of 
an adviser than a stockbroker.124 The 1995 Tully Report concluded that 
the “most important role” of the registered representative is providing 
investment advice to clients.125 
As will be discussed in Part III, by the 1990s, there were many 
examples where leading wire houses advertised their services as 
advisory, with one firm stating that advice and not execution is the core 
of the customer relationship.126 Similar to how the advent of two-tier 
                                                     
119. Id. at 9. 
120. Id. at 9, 154. 
121. Id. at 12; WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 110 (Kennikat Press 1969) 
(1940). 
122. Andre E. Owens & Christie Farris Öberg, Rise of Electronic Trading, in BROKER DEALER 
REGULATION, PLIREF-BDR § 18.3 (2011); Seligman, supra note 114, at 665. 
123. See Laby, supra note 19, at 423–24. 
124. Letter from Barbara Roper, Dir. of Investor Prot., Consumer Fed’n of Am., to Jonathan G. 
Katz, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 7–8 (Jan. 13, 2000). 
125. TULLY ET AL., supra note 110, at 3. 
126. See infra Part 3.A; Roper, supra note 124, at 8.  
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pricing and asset-based fees applied pressure on application of the 
“special compensation” prong of the broker exclusion, the importance of 
the broker’s advice and the manner in which he held himself out to the 
public put pressure on the application of the “solely incidental” 
requirement. 
E. The SEC Addressed Changes in Compensation Through an 
Administrative Rule 
Change often leads to uncertainty, and such was the case with the 
developments discussed here. Brokerage firms were concerned that fee-
based or full service brokerage accounts would become subject to the 
Advisers Act, which would have imposed a fiduciary duty on each 
account. As a result, brokers sought relief from the SEC to continue 
taking advantage of the broker exclusion with respect to those 
accounts.127 Chairman Levitt, nearing the end of his term, was eager to 
see firms comply with his long-desired reforms and was willing to meet 
them halfway with a new exemptive rule.128 In 1999, the SEC proposed 
a rule with the apt title, “Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be 
Investment Advisers.”129 The rule prevented application of the Advisers 
Act to brokerage accounts solely because the firm instituted a two-tier 
pricing structure or charged fee-based compensation.130 The rule would 
have effectively eliminated the “no special compensation” prong of the 
broker exclusion and permitted brokers to benefit from the exclusion 
regardless of the type of compensation received. Perhaps because 
brokers were already offering fee-based accounts, raising the concern 
that they were in violation of the Advisers Act, the SEC’s proposing 
release, in a rare twist, contained “no action” language that allowed 
firms to conduct business as if the rule had already been adopted.131 
                                                     
127. Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Sec. Indus. & Fin. 
Mkts. Ass’n, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 (Feb. 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72599/sia020705.pdf (“[A]n Exchange Act-registered broker-
dealer’s offering its customers the alternative of paying a fee rather than a commission for 
brokerage services should not result in the broker-dealer’s becoming subject to the provisions of the 
Advisers Act.”). 
128. See generally Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Financial Self-Defense: 
Tips From an SEC Insider (Oct. 16, 1999) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/speecharchive/1999/spch305.htm); Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Common Sense Investing in the 21st Century Marketplace (May 23, 1999) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch280.htm). 
129. 1999 Proposing Release, supra note 8. 
130. Id. at 61,228. 
131. Id. at 61,227. 
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As expected, the industry splintered over the merits of the proposal. 
Brokerage firms supported the rule while advisers were firmly 
opposed.132 Just as advisers were concerned about so called tipsters in 
1939 and 1940, advisers in the 1990s maintained that under the proposed 
rule, brokers could disguise themselves as advisers in all material 
respects while avoiding the onerous responsibilities of the Advisers Act. 
Advisers argued that the rule would both allow brokers to compete 
unfairly and deny investors important protections under the Advisers 
Act.133 The Commission proposed a modified rule in January 2005134 
and adopted the final version in April 2005.135 The FPA challenged the 
rule in Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC before the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.136 The court sided with the FPA and 
vacated the rule.137 
Removal of the rule left an unsettling gap for investors, regulators, 
firms, and their lawyers. By vacating the rule, the court effectively 
eliminated the SEC’s “no action” position, under which brokers were 
already acting as if the rule had been adopted, placing customers into 
fee-based brokerage accounts. Absent the new rule, every fee-based 
                                                     
132. 2005 Proposing Release, supra note 76, at 2718. 
133. Id. 
134. 2005 Proposing Release, supra note 76. 
135. Adopting Release, supra note 10. 
136. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2007). According to the 
Government Accountability Office, financial planning involves several services, such as preparing 
financial plans for clients based on their financial circumstances and objectives, making specific 
recommendations to clients, and helping to implement those recommendations. Implementation 
could include providing insurance, securities, or other financial products. Individuals who provide 
financial planning might be associated with an investment adviser or a broker-dealer or both. GAO, 
REGULATORY COVERAGE GENERALLY EXISTS FOR FINANCIAL PLANNERS, BUT CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ISSUES REMAIN 2 (2011). 
137. Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 493. The FPA first challenged the rule in 2004. After the 
final rule was adopted in 2005, the FPA filed another petition for review and the cases were 
consolidated and decided in March 2007. See generally id. Although the case raised policy issues, 
the court decided the matter on technical legal grounds, holding that the SEC lacked the statutory 
authority to adopt the rule. The decision turned on the SEC’s authority in the definitional section of 
the statute. Section 202(a)(11) of the Act defined the term investment adviser. As discussed, section 
202(a)(11)(C) excluded broker-dealers whose advice was solely incidental to brokerage and that did 
not charge special compensation for advice. Section 202(a)(11)(F) contained authority for the SEC 
to exclude “such other persons not within the intent of this paragraph.” Id. at 485. The SEC argued 
that section 202(a)(11)(F) enabled it to exclude brokers that do receive special compensation 
because such brokers provide advice in much the same way as brokers that are already excluded; 
only their method of compensation has changed. The FPA argued that the authority to exclude 
“other” persons referred to persons other than a category of persons already subject to an exclusion, 
namely brokers. Thus, any administrative exclusion for brokers adopted by the SEC was 
impermissible under the grant of statutory authority. The majority agreed with the FPA and vacated 
the rule. Id. at 493. 
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brokerage account was arguably an advisory account, subject to the full 
panoply of investor protections in the Advisers Act, including the strict 
limitations on principal trading discussed above.138 
F. The Obama Administration and Congress Sought a Political 
Solution to Changes in the Securities Industry 
The SEC’s ill-fated regulatory response attempted to relieve brokers 
charging special compensation from application of the Advisers Act. As 
might be expected, Congress took a broader view, responding to a wider 
array of constituencies and seeking a more comprehensive solution to 
the conundrum presented by changes in the industry.139 Like the SEC’s 
response, the political response addressed brokers’ compensation, but it 
went further and took into account shifts in the broker’s role and patterns 
of marketing of brokerage services. 
When the D.C. Circuit vacated the SEC’s rule in 2007, the time was 
ripe for regulatory harmonization to be taken up in legislation. In 2007, 
the housing bubble collapsed and by 2008, the Obama Administration, 
acting through the United States Department of Treasury (Treasury), was 
considering comprehensive regulatory reforms to address the unfolding 
financial crisis.140 Although the division between brokers and advisers 
played little role in the collapse, political capital to address financial 
regulatory reform was high, and impending legislation provided a rare 
opportunity to address regulatory harmonization in a comprehensive 
fashion. In its 2008 Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory 
Structure, Treasury stated that an important factor distinguishing 
advisers from brokers was that advisers are fiduciaries and owe their 
clients a duty of “undivided loyalty.”141 By contrast, Treasury said, 
brokers are subject to a duty of suitability.142 The Blueprint noted the 
convergence of services provided by brokers and advisers. Treasury 
found that the failure to adjust to market developments had led to 
                                                     
138. See supra section I.B.2. To address the predicament regarding principal trading, the SEC 
passed a temporary rule relieving such brokers from the strictures of the principal trading 
requirements. Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients, Advisers Act Release No. 3128, 75 
Fed. Reg. 82236 (Dec. 30, 2010). The temporary rule was extended through December 31, 2012. Id. 
139. Under the separation-of-powers doctrine, agencies refine standards or apply them to 
particular cases while Congress sets policy and drafts broad principles. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-
CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
140. THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 233 (2011); 
TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 21. 
141. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 21, at 121. 
142. Id. 
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investor confusion. The Blueprint recommended statutory changes to 
harmonize the regulation of brokers and advisers offering similar 
services.143 
In 2009, Treasury issued a white paper on reform that echoed the 
2008 Blueprint.144 According to the white paper, an investment adviser 
and a broker providing incidental advice are identical from an investor’s 
vantage point, and investors repose the same degree of trust in brokers as 
they repose in advisers.145 Treasury recommended new legislation to 
require that broker-dealers providing advice “have the same fiduciary 
obligations” as advisers.146 
Treasury’s recommendations in 2008 and 2009 marked an important 
shift from earlier reform efforts. Whereas the SEC’s approach was 
exemptive and permissive, Treasury’s was regulatory and restrictive. 
The SEC focused on compensation and on whether brokers might 
inadvertently become subject to the Advisers Act. The SEC had sought 
to exempt brokers from being regulated as advisers. Treasury’s 
approach, by contrast, recognized developments in the financial services 
market, including the enhanced role brokers play in dispensing advice. 
As a result of these developments, Treasury sought to place additional 
duties on brokers. The SEC, in other words, tried to limit the number of 
brokers that would be subject to the Advisers Act and to a concomitant 
fiduciary duty; Treasury sought to expand the number of brokers that 
would be subject to a fiduciary obligation.147 
After months of wrangling, the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in July 
2010.148 Among other things, the law addressed systemic risk in the 
financial system, enhanced the regulation of derivatives, established the 
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, increased federal deposit 
insurance, and eliminated the registration exemption for hedge fund 
advisers.149 Congress addressed regulatory harmonization of broker-
                                                     
143. Id. at 125–26. Treasury also recommended that advisers be subject to a self-regulatory 
regime similar to the one for broker-dealers. Id. at 126. The SRO issue is still timely but it is not 
addressed in this Article. 
144. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 13, at 71–72. 
145. Id. at 71. 
146. Id. at 72. 
147. Compare Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 20,434–36, with TREASURY WHITE PAPER, 
supra note 13, at 72. 
148. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 14, § 913. 
149. See generally DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL (2011); SIMPSON THACHER & 
BARTLETT LLP, REFLECTIONS ON DODD-FRANK: A LOOK BACK AND A LOOK FORWARD (2011), 
available at http://www.stblaw.com/google_file.cfm?TrackedFile= 
6956153B528CAE9F89BB6C7C98B376BB57B9049AD88C05BC9BAD&TrackedFolder=4B5715
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dealers and investment advisers in Section 913 of the Act.150 Section 913 
has two parts. First, it required the SEC to study the effectiveness of 
existing legal or regulatory standards for brokers, dealers, and 
investment advisers when providing personalized investment advice 
about securities to retail customers, and any potential gaps in the 
regulatory standards.151 Second, the Act authorized the SEC to impose a 
fiduciary duty on brokers that give advice to retail customers about 
securities.152 Congress did not impose a fiduciary obligation; it handed 
the baton to the SEC. 
The SEC released the Section 913 Study in January 2011.153 The 
Study contained two principal recommendations. First, it recommended 
that the Commission consider adopting a rule that applied a uniform 
fiduciary standard to broker-dealers and investment advisers when 
providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail 
customers.154 Second, the Study recommended that regulatory 
protections be harmonized, especially when brokers and advisers are 
performing the same or similar functions.155 The staff identified several 
areas where regulation of brokers and advisers differs and suggested 
how they could be brought into accord.156 In light of the Section 913 
Study, the decision of whether to impose a fiduciary duty on brokers that 
give advice rests squarely on the SEC’s shoulders. Therefore, a key 
question is whether the Commission will be persuaded by arguments in 
favor of a new fiduciary rule. Part II critiques those arguments. 
                                                     
78. 
150. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 14, § 913(b). 
151. Id. § 913(b). 
152. Section 913 amended the Exchange Act to give the SEC authority to adopt rules to provide 
that a broker or dealer, when providing personalized investment advice about securities, has the 
same standard of conduct as an adviser. Id. § 913(g)(1). New rules, if adopted, must provide that the 
standard of conduct applicable to broker-dealers be “no less stringent” than the standards applicable 
under sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act, which hold advisers to a fiduciary duty. Id. 
§ 913(g)(2). Section 913 also provided the SEC with authority to establish a standard of care for 
brokers, dealers, and advisers to act in the “best interest” of their customers—the traditional 
fiduciary standard. Id. 
153. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1. The Section 913 Study was authored by the staff, 
although the Commission authorized its release. 
154. The Study left certain details to be worked out in the future. For example, at a later date, the 
Commission would have to address conflicts of interest and decide how broker-dealers would fulfill 
their fiduciary obligation when engaging in principal trading. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 
vii. 
155. Id. at 129. 
156. Id. at 130–39. 
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II.  CONVENTIONAL ARGUMENTS THAT SUPPORT A 
FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR BROKERS ARE INADEQUATE 
The Dodd-Frank Act gave the SEC legal authority to adopt a 
fiduciary duty for brokers, but the Act did not mandate a fiduciary 
standard, leaving the decision in the SEC’s hands. As a result, after over 
a decade of deliberation and quarrelling over this issue—including a 
contested administrative rule,157 controversial federal legislation,158 and 
numerous surveys and studies159—the question of whether to impose a 
fiduciary duty has returned to the SEC. Academics, interest groups, and 
policy makers have propounded several justifications for the change. 
This Part of the Article critiques the most commonly asserted reasons. 
Although some of the arguments supporting a fiduciary standard are 
stronger than others, they are all incomplete in important respects and do 
not alone provide a justification for a fiduciary duty. The conventional 
arguments put forth to support a fiduciary standard include the 
following: (i) investors are confused about applicable standards for 
brokers and advisers, (ii) obligations currently imposed on brokers and 
advisers are inconsistent, (iii) obligations currently imposed on brokers 
are weak and ought to be enhanced, (iv) the economic benefits of a 
fiduciary standard will exceed the costs, and (v) investors expect brokers 
to operate under a fiduciary standard. 
Some of these reasons overlap. For example, investors might be 
confused about which standard applies because the standards are 
inconsistent. Similarly, investors might be confused because they expect 
brokers to operate under a fiduciary standard. Despite this overlap, I 
distinguish each argument as much as possible. The last reason, investor 
expectations, comes closest to providing a strong foundation for 
imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers. As explained below, however, this 
argument is not sufficient because expectations must be reasonable to 
ground a fiduciary obligation; empirical expectations are not enough. 
Before delving into reasonable expectations, let us first examine each 
argument in more detail. 
                                                     
157. See supra Part I.E. 
158. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 14, § 913. 
159. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1; RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 90. 
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A. Investor Confusion Is an Insufficient Basis to Support a Fiduciary 
Standard 
1. Advocates of a Fiduciary Standard Claim Investor Confusion 
Justifies Regulatory Harmonization 
A common justification for placing a fiduciary duty on brokers that 
give advice is investor confusion, which in large part stems from titles 
that broker-dealer registered representatives use, such as “financial 
advisor” and “financial consultant.”160 Investor confusion was 
highlighted in a Rand Institute for Civil Justice report (Rand Report) 
from 2008.161 When the SEC adopted its exemptive rule in 2005, it 
recognized the complexity of the issues it was addressing and directed 
the SEC staff to prepare recommendations for a study. The resulting 
report, not to be confused with the Section 913 Study,162 was intended to 
compare protections provided to retail customers under the Exchange 
Act163 and the Advisers Act,164 and to recommend ways to address 
concerns arising from any differences.165 The SEC engaged the Rand 
Institute to complete the report and released it in January 2008. The 
Rand Report described brokerage and advisory services and examined 
whether investors understood the differences between them.166 
The Rand Report found a great deal of investor confusion regarding 
the roles of brokers and advisers.167 The Report documented that 
investors are confused about job titles, types of firms, and legal 
                                                     
160. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 90; see also Fausti, supra note 19, at 191 (explaining that 
the Administration’s recommendation for a uniform fiduciary standard is “based on the widespread 
recognition that retail investors are often confused about the differences between investment 
advisers and broker-dealers”); Irwin, Lane & Mendelson, supra note 19, at 53 (“Recent surveys 
concerning investors’ understanding of the distinctions between broker-dealers and investment 
advisers indicate an understandable confusion.”); Di Lorenzo, supra note 19, at 295 (“Dodd-Frank 
is necessary, therefore, to impose uniform duties on broker-dealers in order to help eliminate 
uncertainty in the duties broker-dealers owe to their clients, and thereby increase investor 
protection.”); Knut Rostad, Strengthen Disclosures by Limiting Their Role in the Delivery of 
Investment and Financial Advice, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 141, 144–46 (2011) (reviewing 
studies regarding investor confusion about brokers and advisers); Varnavides, supra note 19, at 204 
(“[B]roker-dealers and investment advisers offer virtually identical services to investors, resulting in 
considerable confusion for both investors and regulators.”). 
161. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 90. 
162. See supra Part I.F. 
163. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo (2006). 
164. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2006). 
165. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 20,442. 
166. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at i. 
167. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 87. 
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distinctions between financial services professionals. According to 
Rand, 49% of respondents believed advisers must act in a customer’s 
best interest, while 42% believed that brokers must act in a customer’s 
best interest.168 Surprisingly, more people thought that brokers (as 
opposed to advisers) were required to disclose conflicts.169 Some 
respondents did not understand the term “fiduciary” and did not know 
that a fiduciary standard is higher than a suitability standard.170 Another 
study conducted by TD Ameritrade in 2006 found that 74% of investors 
did not understand the respective duties imposed on brokers and 
advisers.171 
The ubiquity of investor confusion became a justification for reform. 
The Treasury Department referenced the Rand Report in 2008 to 
demonstrate that investors did not understand the differences between 
brokers and advisers or the standards under which they operated.172 
Treasury stated that the regulatory system had “failed to adjust to market 
developments, leading to investor confusion,” and thus recommended 
legislative changes to harmonize the standards.173 Treasury again 
invoked this justification in 2009, repeating that retail investors were 
confused over differences between brokers and advisers, and placed the 
same degree of trust in brokers as they did in advisers.174 Treasury 
concluded that the SEC should be permitted to harmonize brokers’ and 
advisers’ duties and that brokers that provide advice to retail customers 
should be governed by the same fiduciary standard as advisers.175 
The SEC staff made the same argument in the Section 913 Study. The 
Study showed that retail customers are confused by the role of brokers 
and advisers, and customers of both should be uniformly protected.176 
Industry and public interest groups advocating a fiduciary standard 
similarly point to confusion, arguing that it leads to the inability to make 
                                                     
168. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 89. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 111; Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers and Legislative 
Proposals to Improve Investment Adviser Oversight, Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital 
Mkts.& Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of The Financial Planning 
Coalition), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID= 
258252. 
171. TD AMERITRADE, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT FINANCIAL ADVICE 1 (2006) (on file 
with author).  
172. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 21, at 125. 
173. Id. at 125–26. 
174. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 13, at 71. 
175. Id. 
176. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 101, 107. 
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an informed decision when selecting a financial intermediary. In 
Congressional testimony, proponents of the fiduciary standard stated that 
if all or a large majority of investors understood the differences between 
brokers and advisers, the case for harmonization would diminish.177 
Moreover, these advocates argued that confusion cannot be solved 
through disclosure or investor education.178 
2. Investor Confusion Is Not a Compelling Argument for Regulatory 
Harmonization 
Although it seems investor confusion should be eliminated whenever 
possible, there are at least three reasons why investor confusion alone 
does not justify a fiduciary standard. First, changing the standard may 
simply switch the population that is confused, alleviating confusion for 
some while causing it for others. Recall that 42% of respondents 
mistakenly believed that brokers must act in a customer’s best interest.179 
Many investors, all or part of the remaining 58%, may be well aware 
that brokers owe no such obligation. By changing the rule, those who 
wrongly believed that brokers are fiduciaries would now be correct, 
while ironically the other group might become confused.180 
Second, enhancing the standard of care seems to get the solution 
backward. Instead of addressing the cause of confusion by correcting 
investors’ misunderstanding, imposing a fiduciary obligation alters the 
state of affairs, bringing reality into accord with investors’ confused 
perceptions regardless of whether the change is necessary or appropriate 
independent of confusion. As an analogy, if the speed limit on a highway 
were 65 m.p.h. but drivers were confused and believed it was 55 m.p.h., 
confusion alone would not be a reason to lower the speed limit to 55. 
There are many areas where consumers could be confused about 
professional roles and standards, yet it would be illogical to harmonize 
                                                     
177. Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers and Legislative Proposals to 
Improve Investment Adviser Oversight, Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and 
Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Barbara Roper, Director of Investor 
Protection, Consumer Federation of America), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/ 
Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=258252.  
178. Id. at 5.   
179. See supra Part II.A.1. 
180. It is no response that investors could be educated as to the applicable standard because those 
making the claim about confusion also state that no amount of investor disclosure or education can 
resolve it. See Roper, supra note 177, at 5. That said, the 58% who now correctly understand 
brokers’ duties may be more highly educated or more sophisticated than the 42% who are confused 
and, therefore, the 58% might become aware of regulatory changes and avoid confusion. Even so, 
some portion of the 58% may become confused if the standard changes. 
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those roles and standards simply to eliminate confusion.181 
There might be some instances where confusion alone justifies a 
change in the law. For example, if a single state were to allow motorists 
to drive on the left, driver confusion might be a reason to prohibit the 
change and require everyone to drive on the right. In this example, 
confusion would justify a change because the decision to drive on the 
right is largely arbitrary. It does not really matter on which side of the 
road one drives so long as it is the same side as everyone else. In the 
broker-dealer context, however, the respective responsibilities of brokers 
and advisers are not arbitrary. The responsibilities are tied closely to the 
different roles they play in the markets, which should not be overlooked 
merely to avoid confusion.182 
Third, a fiduciary standard would not necessarily solve investor 
confusion because a fiduciary standard for brokers authorized by the 
Dodd-Frank Act would itself vary from other fiduciary standards.183 The 
fiduciary obligation is notoriously ambiguous.184 The Section 913 Study 
noted this ambiguity and stated that the Commission would have to 
specify what is required by a new fiduciary obligation.185 Although the 
Dodd-Frank Act requires that if a fiduciary standard is imposed on 
brokers it must be at least as strong as the standard imposed on advisers, 
                                                     
181. Consider an example from health care. Physician Assistants (PAs) and nurses perform 
different functions and operate under different standards, and consumers may be confused about 
their respective roles and obligations. PAs perform certain functions of physicians and cannot 
delegate their duties or supervise others. PETER PRATT & LISA KATZ, SCOPE OF PRACTICE OF 
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 16, 39 (2001). PAs must renew their license 
every six years. Id. at 60. By contrast, nurses focus on prevention, health promotion, education, and 
patient assistance. Id. at 20. They are permitted to delegate duties and supervise other nurses, and 
they must renew their license every two years. Id. at 39, 65. If patients were confused about the 
responsibilities of PAs and nurses, it would be illogical to harmonize their obligations, such as by 
requiring PAs to renew their license every two years, or by prohibiting nurses from delegating tasks, 
merely to eliminate patient confusion. One would inquire into whether the changes were justified 
for reasons other than eradicating confusion. 
182. See infra Part II.B.2. 
183. The two SEC Commissioners who disagreed with the publication of the Section 913 Study 
questioned whether a new rule would achieve its desired outcome. Casey & Paredes, supra note 16. 
184. Wall Street and Fiduciary Duties: Can Jail Time Serve as an Adequate Deterrent for Willful 
Violations, Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement 
of Larry E. Ribstein, Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Chair, University of Illinois College of Law) 
(“ʽFiduciary duty’ is one of the most amorphous concepts in the law.”); Langevoort, supra note 7, at 
456 (“[A]n open-ended broker fiduciary obligation is so loaded with unanswered questions that 
baseline predictability would come slowly, if at all.”). The 2009 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary 
includes an observation after the definition of fiduciary that the term is a “vague term, and it has 
been pressed into service for a number of ends.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (9th ed. 2009) 
(quoting D.W.M. WATERS, THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 4 (1964)). 
185. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 121–22. 
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the fiduciary standard is not monolithic and can vary depending on the 
type of relationship.186 The Department of Labor regulates advice by 
financial services professionals to employee benefit plans, participants, 
and beneficiaries, with respect to plans sponsored by private-sector 
employers under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA). The ERISA fiduciary standard is higher than the 
Advisers Act standard.187 As a result, total clarity would not be achieved 
by applying a fiduciary duty to broker-dealers.188 
B. Inconsistent Standards Are an Insufficient Basis to Support 
Regulatory Harmonization 
1. Advocates of a Fiduciary Duty Claim Inconsistent Standards 
Justify Regulatory Harmonization 
As discussed in Part I, brokers’ roles have transformed over the past 
decades.189 The importance of trade execution has receded and advice 
has become predominant. As a result, many brokers have become the 
functional equivalent of investment advisers. They hold themselves out 
as advisers, provide investment advice, and charge an asset-based fee.190 
According to the 2009 Treasury Department White Paper, “investment 
                                                     
186. See Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Runkel Abstract & Title Co., 610 F. Supp. 2d 973, 979 (W.D. Wis. 
2009) (explaining that fiduciary duties vary depending on the type of relationship).  
187. The duty of loyalty under ERISA, for example, is a duty to act for the exclusive purpose of 
providing plan benefits. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. Reg. 65263, 65264 (proposed 
Oct. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510) (temporarily withdrawn on Sept. 19, 2011). 
This is a “sole interest” test similar to the test in trust law. The standard in the Advisers Act is a 
“best interest” standard. Another difference is the scope of prohibited conduct. Under the Advisers 
Act, potentially harmful conduct is generally not prohibited, it must be disclosed. By contrast, 
Congress in ERISA supplemented general duties placed on ERISA fiduciaries with certain 
categorical prohibitions on their activity, which no amount of disclosure can cure. Id. If a person 
selling securities to a plan were a plan fiduciary, the sales transaction would generally be prohibited, 
absent an exemption. Under the Advisers Act, however, principal transactions are permitted with 
appropriate disclosure and consent. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2006). 
188. Professor Thomas Hazen has written that an explicit declaration of a fiduciary duty without 
more would merely add confusion to existing law. Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards 
Sufficient? Principles, Rules, and Fiduciary Duties, supra note 19, at 715. The U.S. Department of 
Labor is currently working on a fiduciary standard for advisers to accounts governed by ERISA. 
The DOL standard will likely differ from the standard imposed on advisers under the Advisers Act. 
See Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers and Legislative Proposals to 
Improve Investment Adviser Oversight, Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t 
Sponsored Enters., 112th Cong. 6 (2011) (statement of Financial Services Roundtable), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=258252. 
189. See supra Part I.D.3. 
190. See Roper, supra note 177, at 3. 
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advisers and broker-dealers are regulated under different statutory and 
regulatory frameworks, even though the services they provide often are 
virtually identical from a retail investor’s perspective.”191 In fact, the 
financial media often refer to “investment advisers” when writing about 
both broker-dealers and advisers.192 Under a functional approach to 
regulation, two groups of people performing the same function should be 
regulated by the same standard. 
Consistent regulation has particular appeal for brokers and advisers. 
88% of investment adviser representatives are also registered 
representatives of broker-dealer firms.193 It makes little sense, one might 
argue, to apply two sets of rules to individuals who both provide advice 
in a similar manner. If an individual can wear an adviser hat one moment 
and a broker hat the next, even though his activity has not changed, 
regulation ought not to change either. Advocates argue that inconsistent 
regulation for what appears to be the same activity justifies harmonizing 
the regulation. 
2. Existence of Inconsistent Standards Is Not a Compelling Argument 
for Regulatory Harmonization 
The plea for consistency assumes that it makes no difference who is 
performing a given function—the function itself matters most. This 
assumption is not always valid. In the case of brokers and advisers, 
although they both provide advice, they perform other activities too, and 
these differences justify different treatment. In the Section 913 Study, the 
SEC staff noted that differences in the regulation of brokers and advisers 
reflect differences in function.194 Dealers, for example, accumulate 
inventory in their own accounts to make markets in securities. Making 
markets is critical to liquidity and encourages investment.195 An 
investor’s knowledge that a future buyer for a security exists increases 
his willingness to enter the market. The fact that broker-dealers are 
willing to assume this market-making role might justify imposing a 
lower duty, particularly if an enhanced duty might inhibit dealers from 
assuming the role.196 Investment advisers cannot perform this market-
                                                     
191. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 13, at 71. 
192. Michael A. Pollock, How to Find Low-Cost Investment Help, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2012, at 
C10. 
193. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 12. 
194. Id. at iii. 
195. Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities Markets 
After the Financial Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 323, 342 (2011). 
196. See SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 119. 
Laby - FINAL Word.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/1/2012  11:20 AM 
2012] SELLING ADVICE AND CREATING EXPECTATIONS 743 
 
making function because, as mentioned above, their ability to trade from 
their own accounts is strictly limited.197 The disparate regulatory 
treatment of brokers and advisers recognizes the different roles they play 
and helps ensure that brokers will continue to perform functions that 
advisers do not or cannot perform. 
Moreover, as with investor confusion, imposing a fiduciary duty on 
brokers is unlikely to resolve the problem of inconsistent regulation. 
Multiple regulators supervise financial institutions at both the federal 
and state level. Even with harmonization, securities, insurance, and bank 
regulators will each supervise advice about products falling under their 
jurisdiction. Moreover, as mentioned, the ERISA fiduciary standard is 
higher than the Advisers Act standard. Imposing a fiduciary duty on 
brokers that give advice will not streamline inconsistent regulation. 
Finally, the goal of consistency does not justify raising brokers’ 
standards any more than it justifies lowering advisers’ standards. An 
argument for consistency is an argument for the same standard to be 
applied to both brokers and advisers. This justification alone, like the 
others, is not sufficiently compelling to raise the standard applicable to 
brokers. 
C. Ineffective Standards Are an Insufficient Basis to Support a 
Fiduciary Obligation 
1. Advocates of a Fiduciary Duty Claim that Ineffective Standards 
Justify Regulatory Harmonization 
Advocates of regulatory harmonization maintain that the standard of 
conduct imposed on broker-dealers is too weak and should be 
strengthened.198 Imposing a fiduciary standard would provide more 
investor protection than a suitability standard.199 According to this 
                                                     
197. See supra Part I.B.2. 
198. Letter from David G. Tittsworth, Exec. Dir., Investment Adviser Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 8 (Aug. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Tittsworth Letter] (on 
file with author) (“The suitability standard falls short of the breadth of the fiduciary duty.”); Reza 
Dibadj, Brokers, Fiduciaries and a Beginning, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 205, 213 (2010) 
(justifying enhanced standard for brokers based on loyalty); Varnavides, supra note 19, at 218 
(“[B]roker-dealer customers are afforded less protection than investment adviser customers because 
broker-dealers are generally not held to a fiduciary standard.”). 
199. Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers and Legislative Proposals to 
Improve Investment Adviser Oversight, Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t 
Sponsored Enters., 112th Cong. 8 (2011) (statement of David G. Tittsworth, Executive Director and 
Executive Vice President, Investment Adviser Association), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=258252. 
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argument, the fiduciary standard is the highest standard under the law 
and, if applied to broker-dealers, it would strengthen investor protection. 
Advocates of a fiduciary standard have argued that differences between 
the duties imposed on brokers and advisers are significant. They argue 
that advisers’ obligations under the Advisers Act, which flow from a 
fiduciary duty, include the following: (i) have a reasonable basis for 
providing advice, (ii) seek best execution, (iii) provide advice that is 
suitable, (iv) avoid placing the adviser’s interests before the client’s, (v) 
avoid using client assets for the adviser’s own purposes, (vi) maintain 
client confidentiality, and (vii) disclose all material facts, including 
material conflicts of interest.200 In addition, advisers are regulated more 
extensively than broker-dealers in other areas, such as disclosure, use of 
solicitors, pay-to-play, proxy voting, and registration and licensing.201 
The regulation of broker-dealers is arguably less demanding. Unlike 
advisers, brokers generally do not operate under a federal fiduciary duty 
and are not subject to the strictures of SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau, Inc.202 Although brokers may be deemed fiduciaries in certain 
situations,203 the duty is contingent upon the actual relationship. Absent 
a special relationship, brokers are held to a standard of suitability. 
According to advocates of a fiduciary standard, this difference is 
important because a broker can recommend a security that is suitable 
though not necessarily in the customer’s best interest.204 Regulators, 
academics, and industry groups concur that the fiduciary standard 
provides more investor protection than a suitability standard.205 
2. Existence of Ineffective Standards Is Not a Compelling Argument 
for Regulatory Harmonization 
There are at least three reasons why the claim that a broker’s standard 
of conduct is weaker than an adviser’s does not alone justify imposing a 
fiduciary duty. First, the duties and obligations imposed on brokers are 
not insubstantial. Although advisers regulated under the Advisers Act 
are held to a fiduciary standard, the Act’s regulation is not necessary for 
imposing a fiduciary duty and some courts hold that brokers are 
                                                     
200. Id.; Tittsworth Letter, supra note 198, at 5. 
201. Tittsworth Letter, supra note 198, at app. A. 
202. See supra Part I.C. 
203. See supra Part I.C. 
204. Tittsworth, supra note 199, at 10; see supra Introduction. 
205. Tittsworth, supra note 199, at 10–11; Tittsworth Letter, supra note 198, at 8 n.23 (collecting 
citations to Congressional testimony). 
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fiduciaries.206 Moreover, the suitability standard referenced above is 
only one example of brokers’ duties. Under Section 15 of the Exchange 
Act, brokers must register with the SEC and most broker-dealers must 
register with FINRA. Section 15 also contains detailed antifraud 
provisions. The antifraud rules applicable to broker-dealers include 
prohibitions on market manipulation, high-pressure sales tactics, 
deceptive recommendations, generation of excessive commissions, 
unauthorized trading, and abuse of customer funds.207 Brokers are also 
subject to the shingle theory.208 And FINRA rules provide a catch-all, 
requiring that brokers adhere to “just and equitable principles of 
trade.”209 According to Professor Thomas Hazen, an authority on 
securities regulation, imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers without more 
is unlikely to impose significantly greater duties on brokers.210 Of the 
seven adviser obligations specified above, all but two (avoiding using 
client assets for the adviser’s own purposes and disclosing material 
conflicts of interest) are generally applicable to brokers. 
Second, assuming that the suitability standard is lower, the mere 
existence of a lower standard is not a basis to raise it. To the extent 
brokers and advisers perform different functions as discussed above,211 
there may be good reasons why the standard of liability for brokers is 
weaker. Imposing a fiduciary obligation would raise the standard of 
conduct, but it would also hinder brokers’ ability to engage in certain 
activity, such as principal trading. Even strong supporters of a fiduciary 
standard have recognized that applying the prophylactic rules in the 
Advisers Act, particularly those governing principal trading, raises 
concerns when applied to brokers.212 As the persistence of the principal 
trading issue demonstrates, imposing a suitability standard as opposed to 
a fiduciary standard might be an acceptable tradeoff between market 
efficiency and investor protection.213 This point is one instantiation of 
                                                     
206. MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 886 F.2d 1249, 1258 
(10th Cir. 1989); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1026 (6th Cir. 1979). 
207. Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient? Principles, Rules, and Fiduciary 
Duties, supra note 19, at 733–34. 
208. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
209. Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient? Principles, Rules, and Fiduciary 
Duties, supra note 19, at 735. 
210. Id. at 715–16. 
211. See supra Part II.B.2. 
212. Roper, supra note 17, at 6. 
213. The ability to trade as a principal is essential to the activity of broker-dealers. At the same 
time, trading as a principal absent express disclosure and consent is fundamentally inconsistent with 
acting as a fiduciary. See Laby, supra note 19, at 425–29. After years of discussing regulatory 
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the broader principle that determining the optimal level of investor 
protection is a matter of finding a tolerable level of investor 
dissatisfaction. At some point, the benefit from imposing additional 
safeguards does not outweigh the additional costs.214 
Finally, a higher standard is not necessarily a better standard. If 
higher were always better, then one ought to raise the standard of 
conduct applicable to brokers and advisers to the highest possible level. 
This makes little sense. Compare the standards imposed on advisers 
under the Advisers Act to those under ERISA. Although advisers face a 
high standard under the Advisers Act, an ERISA standard would be 
higher still.215 If a higher standard were necessarily a better standard, it 
would follow that the Advisers Act standard should be enhanced to an 
ERISA standard. Even proponents of a fiduciary duty for brokers would 
not recommend a change to an ERISA standard. 
D. Purported Economic Benefits Are an Insufficient Basis to Support 
a Fiduciary Standard 
1. Advocates of a Fiduciary Standard Claim Economic Benefits 
Justify Regulatory Harmonization 
Advocates claim a fiduciary standard will benefit investors more than 
it will cost them.216 This argument, unlike the others, is strictly 
utilitarian. Although supporters of a fiduciary standard admit that 
benefits to investors are difficult to quantify, one such supporter has 
estimated that economic harm from advice given under a suitability 
standard could amount to tens of billions of dollars per year if not 
more.217 Imposing a fiduciary standard, therefore, could yield significant 
                                                     
harmonization, there remains a dearth of proposals on how to address principal trading if a fiduciary 
duty were imposed on broker-dealers. Broker-dealers seek to preserve their ability to engage in 
principal trading. SIFMA Framework Letter, supra note 18, at 23. In response, adviser groups state 
that the SEC should examine the approach for brokers and advisers alike. Roper, supra note 17, at 
15. The SEC staff indicated in the SECTION 913 STUDY that this issue would have to be settled by 
the Commission itself. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 120.  
214. This type of analysis was implicit in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), where the 
Supreme Court held that the optimal level of due process before a deprivation of property could 
occur turned on the value of the property, the cost of the procedural safeguard, and the chance of a 
wrongful deprivation because of the lack of the safeguard. Id. 
215. See supra note 187. 
216. See, e.g., MERCER BULLARD, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., PROTECTING INVESTORS—
ESTABLISHING THE SEC FIDUCIARY DUTY STANDARD 19 (2011), available at 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/cons-prot/rr2011-02.pdf. 
217. Roper, supra note 177, at 19. 
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investor savings. Under a fiduciary standard, a broker must choose an 
investment product in the investor’s best interest. For example, where 
several mutual funds are similar in risk, performance, and other 
characteristics, and all could be suitable for the customer, a broker 
would be required to consider which fund has the lowest fees and 
expenses.218 Investors would benefit from a fiduciary standard if it led 
sponsors of financial products to compete on the basis of merit as 
opposed to permitting consideration of which products resulted in more 
generous compensation to the broker.219 
A recent case that illustrates the potential benefits of a fiduciary 
standard is Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.220 This case is a 
good example of personalized investment advice provided by a broker to 
a retail customer.221 In Thomas, a broker-dealer registered representative, 
who was also a representative of an insurance company, advised a 
customer to purchase a proprietary variable life insurance policy.222 A 
variable life insurance policy is regulated as a security because the 
investment risk falls on the annuitant.223 MetLife compensates its 
representatives to sell proprietary products and can terminate employees 
when they fail to meet a sales target.224 The plaintiffs in Thomas alleged 
that the MetLife representative breached his fiduciary duty by failing to 
disclose the conflicts of interest created by the company’s commission 
                                                     
218. Id. at 10; see supra Introduction. 
219. Roper, supra note 177, at 9, 18. Certain brokers allegedly favor their own firm’s products 
even when competitors offer better options. See Craig & Silver-Greenberg, Former Brokers Say 
JPMorgan Favored Selling Bank’s Own Funds Over Others, supra note 20; Craig & Silver-
Greenberg. Many Regulators Put Their Attention on How JPMorgan Marketed its Funds, supra 
note 20. In addition, several studies and reports suggest that conflicts of interest harm investors. See 
GAO, 401(K) PLANS: IMPROVED REGULATION COULD BETTER PROTECT PARTICIPANTS FROM 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (2011); GAO, PRIVATE PENSIONS: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CAN AFFECT 
DEFINED BENEFIT AND DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS (2009); Mercer Bullard, Geoff Friesen & 
Travis Sapp, Investor Timing and Fund Distribution Channels (June 2008) (unpublished), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070545; Xinge Zhao, The Role of Brokers and Financial Advisors 
Behind Investments Into Load Funds (Dec. 2005) (unpublished), available at 
http://www.ceibs.edu/knowledge/papers/images/20060317/2845.pdf. A fiduciary standard would 
address conflicts of interest and, therefore, might reduce or eliminate the harms discussed. These 
studies and reports, however, are not specifically tied to implementing a fiduciary duty for brokers 
that give advice to retail customers, and one cannot assume that the harms set forth would be 
eliminated by adopting a new fiduciary standard under Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
220. 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011).  
221. Id. at 1157. 
222. Id. 
223. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959). 
224. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1157. 
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structure, fees, job-retention policies, and other incentives.225 The 
plaintiffs sought restitution of commissions and fees allegedly paid in 
exchange for advice, including insurance premiums insofar as the 
premiums included commissions and fees.226 The court, however, held 
that the representative’s advice was solely incidental to brokerage.227 He 
was not acting as an investment adviser and not subject to a fiduciary 
duty. 
Thomas presents precisely the situation that would be covered by a 
new fiduciary duty. Had the representative in this case been subject to a 
fiduciary standard, he would have been required to disclose conflicts of 
interest regarding his incentive to sell a proprietary product and the 
customer may have avoided the investment.228 
2. Economic Benefits of a Fiduciary Standard Do Not Necessarily 
Outweigh Costs 
Although investor benefits from a fiduciary standard may be 
significant, they are unsubstantiated. In opposing the release of the 
Section 913 Study, two Commissioners stated that the Study did not 
account sufficiently for the potential cost of imposing a fiduciary 
standard, and insisted instead that the Section 913 Study should be a 
starting point for further research.229 The Commissioners explained that 
the Study discounted the concern that, as a result of new burdens 
imposed on brokers, investors would have fewer professionals to choose 
from, would have fewer products and services available to them, and 
may have to pay more for the services they receive. They argued that 
without additional data on investor preferences, the SEC was unable to 
assess the costs of imposing a fiduciary standard.230 The dissenting 
Commissioners were not opposed to a fiduciary obligation, but thought 
more data was essential before moving forward. 
Some argue that the costs of a new fiduciary duty would outweigh the 
benefits.231 A 2010 study prepared by Oliver Wyman, a management 
consulting firm, assessed the impacts of a new fiduciary standard on 
                                                     
225. Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2008 WL 4619822, at *1 (W.D. Okla. 
Oct. 16, 2008). 
226. Id. 
227. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1167. 
228. Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties and the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 19, 
at 53. 
229. Casey & Paredes, supra note 16. 
230. Id. 
231. See Allen, supra note 19, at 12 (noting potential costs to implementing a fiduciary standard). 
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consumer choice, product access, and affordability of advisory 
services.232 The study found that a new fiduciary obligation on brokers 
could result in reduced access to investment advice, to products 
distributed primarily through brokers, and to other affordable investment 
options.233 The study found that the additional compliance costs could 
cause twelve to seventeen million small investors to lose access to their 
current level of advisory services.234 Investor returns could also be 
negatively affected. According to the study, a current expected return on 
a customer account would fall from 4.06% to 3.63% if a fiduciary 
standard were imposed.235 Harmonization proponents strongly criticized 
Oliver Wyman’s analysis and regard it with little weight.236 
To date, there is no clear consensus on the economic benefits of a 
fiduciary standard. Costs and benefits of proposed rules are difficult to 
measure, data is scarce, and studies are open to critique.237 As a result, 
economic benefits alone are an insufficient basis thus far to support a 
                                                     
232. OLIVER WYMAN, STANDARD OF CARE HARMONIZATION: IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR SEC 
(2010), available at http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=21999. 
233. Id. at 4. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 28. 
236. Fiduciary proponents argue that the Oliver Wyman analysis assumed elimination of the 
broker-dealer exclusion from the Advisers Act. Financial Planning Coalition, supra note 170, at 7. 
Eliminating the broker-dealer exclusion in its entirety—an event which is unlikely to occur—would 
subject brokers to all of the Investment Advisers Act, not only a fiduciary duty. The Senate 
Committee considered such an action in draft legislation. This language, however, was not enacted 
as part of the final bill. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong., 
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009: Chairman’s Mark Text (2009) (on file with 
author). Moreover, in the Section 913 Study, the SEC staff recommended that Congress not repeal 
the exclusion. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 139–40. The analysis also assumed that brokers 
would be disabled from charging commissions, even though a fiduciary standard does not itself 
prohibit doing so. Finally, the Wyman analysis assumed that a fiduciary standard would restrict the 
sale of proprietary products and prohibit the sale of products on a principal basis. The Dodd-Frank 
Act, however, did not prohibit principal transactions or the sale of proprietary products. Indeed, the 
latter was explicitly permitted. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 14, § 913(g)(1). 
237. In a recent Department of Labor (DOL) rule proposal to expand the definition of the term 
investment adviser “fiduciary” under ERISA rules, the DOL acknowledged the difficulty of 
quantifying the benefits associated with the eradication of conflicts of interest. Instead, under a 
heading of qualitative benefits, the DOL wrote that given the magnitude of the assets at stake in 
ERISA plans, even a small value improvement in a moderate number of plans could result in 
economically significant benefits. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. Reg. 65263, 65270 
(proposed Oct. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510) (temporarily withdrawn on Sept. 19, 
2011). SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro outlined steps the SEC is taking to understand the economic 
effects of imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers. Chairman Schapiro stated that the SEC staff is 
drafting a public request for information to obtain data on regulatory alternatives. Letter from Mary 
L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Representative Scott Garrett, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. (Jan. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.mfdf.org/images/uploads/blog_files/Garrett_1-10-12.pdf. 
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fiduciary standard. Although the SEC is under pressure to give more 
consideration to the economic costs and benefits of proposed rules, it is 
unlikely that economic benefits alone will serve as a complete 
justification to implement a new fiduciary standard.238 The justification 
will have to be based largely on non-economic grounds. 
E. Empirical Expectations Are an Insufficient Basis to Support a 
Fiduciary Standard 
1. Advocates of a Fiduciary Standard Claim that Investor 
Expectations Justify Regulatory Harmonization 
The investor expectations claim is similar in some respects to the 
investor confusion claim. Although brokers are held to a standard of 
suitability, investors expect that brokers are held to a fiduciary standard. 
The Section 913 Study opened by stating that investors rely on brokers 
and advisers for advice and expect advice to be in investors’ best 
interest.239 That brokers are not held to a fiduciary standard may be 
disclosed in the fine print. Investors, however, should not have to parse 
through legalese to learn that they are receiving advice inconsistent with 
their expectations.240 
The investor expectations claim appears to rely on empirical evidence 
about their actual expectations.241 Supporters of the fiduciary standard 
                                                     
238. Although no statute requires the SEC to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, it has done so 
since the 1980s as a matter of good regulatory practice. Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking: 
Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on TARP, Financial Services and Bailouts of Public and Private 
Programs, 112th Cong. 4–5 (2012) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/4-17-12-Schapiro-
Testimony.pdf. Where benefits cannot be monetized, agencies are expected to account for 
compliance costs with proposed rules and compare them with qualitative benefits. Robert Litan, 
Regulation, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Regulation.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2012). When engaged in 
certain types of rulemaking, the SEC must consider whether the action will promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation. Securities Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(b) (2006); Securities 
Exchange Act §§ 3(f), 23(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 78w(a)(2) (2006); Investment Company Act 
§ 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c) (2006). Some in the financial services industry have successfully 
argued that the SEC acted arbitrarily in adopting certain rules because it failed to determine their 
likely economic consequences and to connect those consequences to efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. Equity 
Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 
F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005). These decisions have placed pressure on the SEC to provide a 
robust cost-benefit analysis to support its rules. 
239. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at i. 
240. Id. at 101, 107; see also Financial Planning Coalition, supra note 170, at 3. 
241. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 101. 
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point to a survey by ORC International,242 which showed responders 
were as likely to believe that financial advisors (a title used by broker-
dealer registered representatives) were fiduciaries as they were to 
believe that financial planners and investment advisers were 
fiduciaries.243 Similarly, the Rand Report referred to a TD Ameritrade 
survey, which found that more than 60% of respondents believed 
brokers have a fiduciary duty and 90% of respondents believed that 
advisers owe a fiduciary duty.244 
The expectations argument is related to the confusion argument in the 
sense that if investors expect brokers are fiduciaries, then investors are 
confused about brokers’ actual responsibilities. One proponent of a 
fiduciary standard has joined the confusion claim and the expectation 
claim, stating that brokers have marketed themselves as advisers, 
resulting in customer confusion and, at the same time, vitiating customer 
expectations.245 Although it might be tempting to group the confusion 
and the expectations arguments together, the expectations argument is 
different from the confusion argument and merits a separate response. 
Investors who expect brokers to be fiduciaries may not view their beliefs 
as confused at all. Investor expectations, the argument goes, justify a 
change in the law to align it with their expectations regardless of 
whether the expectations are a source of confusion.246 
2. Empirical Expectations Do Not Themselves Justify a Fiduciary 
Duty for Brokers 
Empirical expectations alone do not justify a fiduciary duty. First, just 
as with investor confusion, it would be illogical to change the status quo 
so that it became consistent with investors’ expectations, absent an 
independent reason that one’s expectations should be met.247 In other 
words, before determining that expectations are a reason to change the 
                                                     
242. Roper, supra note 177, at 5. 
243. Id. 
244. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 31. 
245. Tittsworth Letter, supra note 198, at 10. 
246. Other survey data cited to support the claim about investor expectations is less persuasive. 
ORC Survey responders also stated that if a broker and adviser provide the same services, they 
should have to follow the same rules. The person providing advice, survey responders said, “should 
put your interests ahead of theirs.” Roper, supra note 177, at 5 (quoting INFOGROUP/ORC, U.S. 
INVESTORS & THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD 18 (2010)). This survey response, however, is not really 
about investor expectations; this question asks individuals about what the law should be. Investors’ 
normative views of the law are not the same as cataloguing their expectations of what the law 
actually is.  
247. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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law, one needs an account for why investors have such expectations and 
whether they are worth vindicating. As explained above, there may be 
good reasons to permit brokers to operate under a non-fiduciary 
standard, even if that standard does not comport with investors’ 
expectations.248 
An analogy might be helpful. Take the case of airline passengers 
whose flight is canceled and the next departing fight is the following 
day. Those passengers likely expect a voucher for one night’s lodging or 
some other form of compensation. The fact that passengers expect to 
receive a voucher under these circumstances is not necessarily a reason 
to require it. (Similarly, the fact that passengers do not expect a voucher 
is not a reason not to provide one.) One can look to other considerations, 
such as the airline’s cost of providing vouchers and passengers’ cost of 
not receiving them. Many relevant considerations apart from customers’ 
empirical expectations would enter into a decision to impose a voucher 
requirement. 
It may be more profitable to view the argument about expectations as 
an argument about reasonable expectations. Perhaps those advocating a 
fiduciary standard based on expectations are really making an argument 
about reasonable expectations and invoking survey results and other 
empirical data to support a reasonable expectations claim. In other 
words, the fact that investors actually expect a broker to operate under a 
fiduciary standard gives a reasonable expectations claim empirical 
support. Something more than empirical expectations, however, is 
required to give rise to reasonable expectations. 
Look again at the analogy: If a particular airline has a practice of 
dispensing vouchers when canceling evening flights, and if a passenger 
has received such vouchers in the past, the passenger might have a 
strong expectation that he will receive a voucher when his evening flight 
is canceled. The passenger’s expectation, however, would not give rise 
to an entitlement. However, if this airline held itself out as the airline 
that assures on-time departures, then one could craft an argument about 
reasonable expectations based on the airline’s own claim, which has 
little to do with empirical expectations. The question is whether the 
airline has done something to strengthen the justificatory force of the 
passenger’s expectation.249 In the new analogy, the airline has arguably 
induced the passenger to choose it over competing airlines by assuring 
on-time departures. 
                                                     
248. See supra Part II.C.2. 
249. Catherine Mitchell, Leading a Life of its Own? The Roles of Reasonable Expectation in 
Contract Law, 23 O.J.L.S. 639, 656 (2003). 
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A comparable distinction between empirical and reasonable 
expectations is important to the doctrine of apparent authority in agency 
law. Apparent authority is the power held by an agent to affect a 
principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party 
“reasonably believes” the agent has authority to act on the principal’s 
behalf, and the belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.250 It 
is not enough for apparent authority that a third person empirically 
believes that an actor was authorized by a principal; the belief must be 
reasonable. 
Supporters of a fiduciary standard appear to rely on empirical 
expectations, not reasonable expectations. Although the Section 913 
Study stated that investors have a “reasonable expectation” that advice 
they are receiving is in their best interest,251 it provided little or no 
foundation for reasonable expectations other than empirical 
expectations.252 As discussed more fully in Part III, empirical 
expectations alone do not justify a change in the law; reasonable 
expectations may provide a better argument. 
This Part has shown that the conventional arguments for placing a 
fiduciary duty on brokers that provide advice are incomplete and do not 
alone justify a new fiduciary obligation. Investor confusion, inconsistent 
standards, ineffective standards, and economic benefits appear to be 
plausible arguments, but after careful consideration, each fails to fully 
support a fiduciary duty. The last argument, investor expectations, is 
most persuasive, but a stronger argument turns on reasonable 
expectations, not empirical expectations. 
III. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS JUSTIFY A FIDUCIARY 
OBLIGATION FOR BROKER-DEALERS 
This Part puts forth a justification for placing a fiduciary duty on 
brokers that give personalized advice to retail customers. While the 
conventional justifications for a fiduciary obligation are not compelling, 
this Part argues that a broker-dealer’s use of advertisements and titles 
replete with advice language gives rise to a reasonable expectation that 
the broker will operate under a fiduciary standard. Reasonable 
expectations have consequences for regulation as well as under the 
common law. As a regulatory matter, use of advertisements and titles 
justifies a new administrative rule imposing a fiduciary standard. Under 
                                                     
250. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006). 
251. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 101. 
252. Id.; see also Financial Planning Coalition, supra note 170, at 3. 
Laby - FINAL Word.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/1/2012  11:20 AM 
754 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:707 
 
the common law, reasonable expectations can ground a fiduciary 
obligation for broker-dealers that give personalized investment advice to 
retail customers. Reasonable expectations of the parties provide a more 
complete justification for a fiduciary standard than those reasons already 
put forth.253 
A. Broker-Dealers Employ Advertisements and Titles Promoting the 
Advisory Function 
This section begins by reviewing advertisements by broker-dealers 
over the past decades and shows how they have evolved by increasingly 
emphasizing advice. This section is not a comprehensive survey of 
brokers’ advertisements. It shows anecdotally that brokers advertise 
independent, objective advice. This section will also discuss studies that 
have examined broker-dealer advertising and support the conclusions 
drawn from the anecdotes. 
Historically, brokerage firms resisted advertising. Advertising was 
viewed as unrefined and inconsistent with the patrician image the firms 
sought to promote.254 Historian Edwin J. Perkins has suggested that 
brokerage firms initially resisted advertising to maintain a de facto cartel 
and avoid destructive competition amongst themselves.255 This 
resistance changed to some degree with Merrill Lynch’s decision to 
break ranks and advertise in the 1940s.256 After Merrill Lynch began to 
advertise, the NYSE encouraged the practice through its “Own Your 
Share of American Business” campaign, which ran from 1954 to 
                                                     
253. The argument from reasonable expectations does not depend on the outcome of a traditional 
cost-benefit analysis. A robust cost-benefit analysis regarding imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers 
that give advice is difficult to complete because the benefits are diffuse and hard to measure, and 
good estimates of the costs are difficult to obtain. The analysis, therefore, does not turn on a 
traditional cost-benefit analysis. The argument relies instead on reasonable expectations that broker-
dealers have created over the years through marketing and advertising. One determines reasonable 
expectations based on a variety of factors. This is not to say that costs and benefits of imposing a 
fiduciary duty are irrelevant. In fact, the reasonableness of an expectation is determined in part by 
the social consequences of imposing liability based on the expectation. For example, if an 
electronics mart advertises televisions for $199, it cannot claim that the actual price is $250. 
However, the store is not required to have an unlimited quantity available at the advertised price. A 
reasonable person would know that quantity is limited. One’s analysis of reasonableness is based in 
part on the social costs of requiring the store to stock an unlimited quantity. Thus, costs and benefits 
are relevant to but not determinative of reasonableness. 
254. EDWIN J. PERKINS, WALL STREET TO MAIN STREET: CHARLES MERRILL AND MIDDLE-
CLASS INVESTORS 56–57, 201 (1999); Traflet & Coyne, supra note 97, at 136. 
255. PERKINS, supra note 254, at 57. 
256. Id. at 201. Charles Merrill drew from his deep involvement with Safeway Stores and 
initiated an informational advertising campaign at Merrill Lynch. Id. at 12, 204–05. 
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1968.257 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, advertising by the larger 
firms began to target individual investors. One advertisement offered 
“service to every investor, including the ‘little guy.’”258 Another focused 
on “investment insight” applied to the “individual needs” of clients.259 
By the early 1970s, several brokerage firms were enhancing their 
advertising to appeal to the investment needs of small investors. 
The elimination of fixed commissions in 1975 was a turning point in 
brokerage advertising. First, as commission rates began to drop, 
brokerage firms needed to advertise their new fee structures to win over 
new customers and retain existing ones.260 Second, in 1976 and 1977, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that prohibitions on professional 
advertising constituted a violation of the right of free speech under the 
First Amendment.261 These developments led to widespread advertising 
by many professionals, including brokers.262 
As brokerage advertising developed, firms began to shift from use of 
the terms “brokerage firm” or “stockbroker.” In the early 1980s, firms 
often advertised in print media using the phrase “brokerage services.”263 
Although a few firms started using the term “Account Executive” to 
describe their registered representatives in the 1960s and early 1970s,264 
other firms continued to use the term “stockbroker” through the early 
1980s.265 Moreover, in the early 1980s, firms did not yet advertise 
advice as their primary function, stating instead that accounts were 
“serviced” by account executives, rather than “managed” or 
“advised.”266 
In the 1960s and 1970s a slow trend began whereby some firms’ 
advertisements began to use language suggestive of advice.267 In the 
                                                     
257. Janice Traflet, Spreading the Ideal of Mass Ownership: Public Relations and the NYSE, 22 
ESSAYS ECON. & BUS. HIST. 257, 266–67 (2004). 
258. See FORBES, Aug. 1, 1971, at 14 (Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., advertisement). 
259. See TIME, July 22, 1966, at 82 (Prudential Bache & Co., advertisement); see also TIME, Aug. 
5, 1966, at 91 (Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, advertisement). 
260. Traflet & Coyne, supra note 97, at 136. 
261. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (lawyers); Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. 
Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (pharmacists). 
262. Traflet & Coyne, supra note 97, at 137. 
263. See FORBES, Jan. 21, 1980, at 93 (Fidelity Brokerage Services, Inc., advertisement). 
264. FORBES, Jan. 15, 1973, at 35 (Reynolds Securities, Inc., advertisement); TIME, July 1, 1966, 
at 73 (Merrill Lynch, advertisement). 
265. See FORBES, Apr. 25, 1983, at 45 (Kidder Peabody & Co., advertisement); FORBES, Jan. 21, 
1980, at 93 (Fidelity Brokerage Services, Inc. advertisement). 
266. FORBES, Apr. 11, 1983, at 189 (Merrill Lynch advertisement). 
267. FORBES, Jan. 15, 1973, at 35 (Reynolds Securities, Inc. advertisement); FORBES, Aug. 1, 
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early to mid 1980s, brokerage firms explicitly advertised advice and 
financial planning. One firm referred to the “quality of investment 
advice” it provided.268 “Total Financial Planning,” another firm 
advertised, “requires a careful assessment of your entire financial 
situation, and the assembling of a financial profile that forms the basis of 
an approach to meet all your financial objectives.”269 By the mid-1980s, 
firms used the title “Financial Consultant” to refer to broker-dealer 
registered representatives.270 The term “consultant” suggested that the 
firm was acting in an advisory capacity.271 In the 1990s, some firms 
started using the title “Financial Advisor,” more explicitly suggesting an 
advisory relationship.272 
By the late 1980s, brokerage firms not only referred to their registered 
representatives as Financial Consultants, they also encouraged investors 
to talk to the Financial Consultant for “straight answers” and advertised 
the Financial Consultant as a “valuable source of information,” 
suggesting that the customer could turn to the representative for 
advice.273 One advertisement from this period noted that the Financial 
Consultant began the customer relationship by asking about long-term 
goals and levels of risk, and setting priorities.274 Another stated that 
individuals were seeking “answers, not sales talk.”275 Still another 
exclaimed in large lettering: “Ask for investment help and we’ll answer. 
In person.”276 By 1995, advertising advice by brokers was more 
ubiquitous, with some firms advertising a close personal relationship 
between the broker and the customer, including text and images 
                                                     
1971, at 14 (Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., advertisement); TIME, July 22, 1966, at 76 
(Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., advertisement). 
268. BUS. WEEK, Apr. 18, 1986, at 3 (Drexel Burnham advertisement). 
269. FORBES, Apr. 25, 1983, at 89 (Prudential Bache Securities advertisement). 
270. FORBES, Oct. 2, 1989, at 97 (Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., advertisement); 
BUS. WEEK, July 21, 1986, at 109 (Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith advertisement); FORBES, 
July 14, 1986, at 1 (Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith advertisement); FORBES, Apr. 8, 1985, at 
145 (Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc., advertisement). 
271. A definition of consultant is “[a] person qualified to give professional advice or 
services . . . an adviser.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Online ed. March 2012), available at 
http://oed.com/view/Entry/39956?redirectedFrom=consultant#eid. Consultant is also defined as “a 
person who gives professional or expert advice.” Id. 
272. FORBES, Apr. 20, 1998, at 75 (Prudential Securities advertisement); FORBES, Apr. 6, 1998, 
at 55 (Prudential Securities advertisement). 
273. FORBES, Apr. 30, 1990, at 132 (Merrill Lynch advertisement); FORBES, July 14, 1986, at 1 
(Merrill Lynch advertisement). 
274. FORBES, July 14, 1986, at 1 (Merrill Lynch advertisement). 
275. MONEY MAGAZINE, Apr. 1989, at S5 (Fidelity advertisement). 
276. MONEY MAGAZINE, Mar. 1989, at 148 (First Investors advertisement). 
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demonstrating the broker’s concern and involvement with the customer’s 
family members.277 One advertisement from that period referred 
explicitly to the provision of “financial advice” and declared that more 
clients “trusted” the firm with their assets than any other firm.278 A 2012 
advertisement highlights, and has registered, the phrase: “So what do I 
do with my money?”279 
This evidence of broker advertising is not merely anecdotal. 
According to the Rand Report, advertising campaigns by larger 
brokerage firms often promoted experience in managing money.280 
Investment advisers interviewed by Rand observed that brokers’ 
advertisements sounded as if they were selling advice. Brokers’ 
advertisements, the advisers said, portrayed a close relationship between 
the firm and the customer by using imagery such as a broker attending a 
customer’s family function or a broker and customer walking down the 
beach together.281 Although advisers’ views about brokers may be 
colored by competition, these reports corroborate the emphasis on 
personalized advice in the examples above.282 
According to the Rand Report, use of titles also connotes an advisory 
relationship. The most commonly reported title for a registered 
representative was “financial advisor.”283 Other typical titles included 
“financial consultant,” “financial representative,” “investment 
specialist,” “investment representative,” and “registered 
representative.”284 According to the Section 913 Study, these titles—
particularly financial advisor and financial consultant—strongly suggest 
                                                     
277. BUS. WEEK, May 3, 1993, at 123 (Paine Webber advertisement); BUS. WEEK, Apr. 5, 1993, 
at 36 (Paine Webber advertisement); see also BUS. WEEK, Apr. 12, 1993, at 15 (Putman Inv. 
Advertisement). 
278. HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 25 (Merrill Lynch advertisement); see also FORBES, 
Apr. 20, 1998, at 105 (Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. advertisement). 
279. WALL ST. J., June 5, 2012, at A13 (BlackRock, Inc. advertisement). 
280. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 70. 
281. Id. at 71. 
282. Mercedes M. Cardona & Hillary Chura, Morgan Stanley Pursues Younger, Well-Heeled 
Investors: Brokerage Expands Its Target, Aims for the Internet-Savvy, 71 ADVERTISING AGE 3 
(2000) (quoting ads emphasizing level of knowledge brokers bring to the relationship); Mercedes 
M. Cardona, Paul Polito, 72 ADVERTISING AGE 29 (2001) (quoting Merrill Lynch executive stating 
that the firm is trying to make people understand “there is no better time to get advice”); 
Christopher Hosford, Financial Services Advertising Roars Back, B TO B, Aug. 16, 2010, 
http://www.btobonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100816/FREE/308169986/0/SEARCH 
(quoting Fidelity executive stating a recent ad campaign to emphasize the advisory role increased 
brand preference by 66%). 
283. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 91. 
284. Id. at 74. 
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that the individual will provide investment advice and counseling. 
Moreover, use of these titles actually affected customers.285 Respondents 
equated the titles financial advisor and financial consultant to an 
investment adviser rather than a broker-dealer.286 
The use of advertising and titles with advice language evokes a 
personal connection that was historically the cornerstone of the advisory 
relationship. Recall that the Advisers Act was intended to promote the 
personal confidential relationship that existed between the adviser and 
the client.287 In addition, the personal relationship promoted by 
advertising triggers the authority in Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
which is limited to the context of providing “personalized” investment 
advice to retail customers.288 Although a cynic might view the terms 
“adviser” or “consultant” as phatic discourse meant to create goodwill, 
disregarding this language ignores the potential it has to induce 
customers to act in response. Because the use of this language is 
intentional, one should examine how it might bear on expectations. 
B. Broker Advertising Creates Reasonable Expectations to Receive 
Advice 
1. Reasonable Expectations Can Ground a Right 
A reasonable expectation is one element in the argument for a legal 
right.289 A reasonable expectation implies in the first instance that a 
person believes he has an entitlement to be treated in a certain way, and 
that the belief is based on objective criteria.290 The expectation alone 
does not demonstrate that the person has a legal right.291 The right is 
based on a legal system’s recognition of reasonable expectations.292 
Reasonable expectations are particularly important in the law of 
agency. As discussed above, an agency relationship is formed under the 
doctrine of apparent authority when a third party reasonably believes an 
agent has authority to act on the principal’s behalf, and the belief is 
                                                     
285. Id. at 92. 
286. Id.  
287. See supra Part I.B.2. 
288. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 14, § 913(f). 
289. Mitchell, supra note 249, at 642. 
290. Id. 
291. Id.  
292. Id. at 644. Mitchell inserts an intermediate step of legitimate expectation, which is situated 
between reasonable expectation and legal entitlement. A legitimate expectation requires an 
argument for recognizing one’s expectation as legitimate. Id. 
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traceable to the principal’s manifestations.293 The purpose of the 
apparent agency doctrine is to hold a principal accountable for the 
results of a third party’s belief about an actor’s authority to act as an 
agent, but only when the belief is reasonable and traceable to the 
principal’s conduct. According to the Restatement (Third) of Agency, 
reasonability can turn on, among other things, an industry and its 
customs, a transaction that is conventionally done in a particular way, or 
reasonable expectations based on analogous situations.294 
Reasonable expectations are also important in the law of contract. The 
primary purpose of contract law is the realization of reasonable 
expectations induced by making a promise.295 Promises can be either 
implied or express. If a person has reason to know that his words may 
cause another to believe a promise is intended, and the promisee alters 
her beliefs accordingly, a promise is legally made.296 A promise is “an 
expression of commitment to act in a specified way communicated in 
such a way that the addressee of the expression may justly expect 
performance and may reasonably rely thereon.”297 The key question is 
whether the addressee may justly expect performance. To determine 
when an expectation is just, courts look to whether an expectation is 
reasonable under the circumstances; contract law protects reasonable 
expectations.298 
2. Several Criteria Can Determine Reasonable Expectations 
Before examining whether advertisements and titles with advice 
language create a reasonable expectation that brokers will provide 
advice, one must first decide what serves as a basis for a reasonable 
expectation. There are at least three possibilities: the contract itself, the 
                                                     
293. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006). 
294. Id. § 2.03 cmt. d. 
295. 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 2 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. 
ed. 1993). 
296. Id. § 1.13, at 37. 
297. Id. § 1.13, at 35. 
298. Id. § 1.1, at 2–5. The same principle is captured by the definition of “offer.” According to 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, an offer is defined as “the manifestation of willingness to 
enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that 
bargain is invited and will conclude it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981). 
Again, the key question is whether the manifestation justifies another in assuming that his assent 
will conclude a bargain. This answer turns on when a reasonable person would understand or expect 
that a merchant manifests an intention to create a binding relationship. Jay M. Feinman & Stephen 
R. Brill, Is an Advertisement an Offer? Why It Is, and Why It Matters, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 77 
(2006). 
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parties’ empirical beliefs, and the parties’ normative expectations. 
a. The Contract Is One Basis for Determining Reasonable 
Expectations 
The first candidate to ground the parties’ reasonable expectations is 
the contract itself. The best guide to the parties’ expectations is often 
their own contractual language.299 Thus, a court’s primary concern is 
often to determine the parties’ intentions as they are expressed in the 
written contract.300 There are many contracts, however, that at least one 
party neither reads nor understands. And even if the parties read and 
understand the document, the parties may have numerous expectations 
not embodied in the contract itself, particularly for standardized 
agreements. Under conventional contract doctrine, a standardized 
agreement is not necessarily given effect if its terms are at odds with the 
reasonable expectations of the party who did not prepare it.301 As a 
result, the contract alone can be insufficient as a source of reasonable 
expectations. 
b. Empirical Expectations Form Another Basis for Determining 
Reasonable Expectations 
Empirical expectations are relevant, but they are not determinative of 
reasonable expectations. The phrase “reasonable expectation” has two 
parts, each of which is important. The word “expectation” refers to a 
mental state, and is defined as the “forecasting [of] something to happen, 
or anticipating something to be received; anticipation; a preconceived 
idea or opinion with regard to what will take place.”302 One 
characterization of expectation is “looking for something as one’s 
due.”303 Expectation, therefore, connotes subjectivity.304 The other part 
of reasonable expectations, “reasonable,” implies the presence of just or 
                                                     
299. See, e.g., Law Debenture Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Maverick Tube Corp., 595 F.3d 458, 467 (2d 
Cir. 2010); Gibney v. Pillifant, 32 So.3d 784, 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
300. Albemarle Corp. v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 2d 652, 659 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
301. CORBIN, supra note 295, § 1.1, at 5; see A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium for 
Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C. Chem. Grp., Inc., 873 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Courts look to 
all of the circumstances surrounding the negotiations, including the actions of the principles both 
during and after, to determine what the parties intended.”). 
302. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 271, available at http://oed.com/view/Entry/ 
66455?redirectedFrom=expectation#eid. 
303. Id. 
304. Bailey H. Kuklin, The Plausibility of Legally Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 32 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 19, 23–24 (1997). 
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legitimate grounds for doing or believing something, as in “reasonable 
cause” or “reasonable doubt.”305 Reasonable, therefore, connotes 
objectivity or normativity. 
While subjective expectations are relevant to reasonable expectations, 
they are not conclusive. Whether an expectation is reasonable does not 
turn on survey data of actual expectations.306 Expectations held by the 
average investor, or even the majority of investors, are not necessarily 
reasonable and, therefore, are insufficient to ground liability.307 A person 
might expect an event to occur in the future simply because a similar 
event has occurred in the past. As demonstrated with the airline 
example, empirical expectations are both an insufficient basis to support 
a claim of entitlement308 and a weak basis for liability.309 
The importance of objectivity with regard to expectations was 
established in the historical debate in contract law between the 
subjectivists and objectivists. Subjectivists looked to the parties’ actual 
assent to an agreement to determine whether a contract was in force.310 
Objectivists looked to external or objective appearances of the parties’ 
intentions.311 As Learned Hand famously wrote, “[a] contract has, 
strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of 
the parties.”312 Actual assent is not necessary for a court to find 
reasonable expectations, or to find that a contract has been concluded. 
Instead, the law protects reasonable expectations.313 Courts are not 
indifferent to parties’ actual expectations but, as Arthur Corbin 
explained in his classic treatise, justice is not served by enforcing every 
result that either party may expect, or by not enforcing a result unless 
both parties expect and intend the result.314 
Similar principles apply when courts imply terms into a contract. 
                                                     
305. Id. at 24. 
306. Feinman & Brill, supra note 298, at 77. 
307. CORBIN, supra note 295, § 1.9, at 25 (“Agreement consists of mutual expressions; it does 
not consist of harmonious intentions or states of mind.”); Feinman & Brill, supra note 298, at 77; 
Mitchell, supra note 249, at 656. 
308. See supra Part II.E.2. 
309. Mitchell, supra note 249, at 656. 
310. 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 208–10 (3d ed. 2004). 
311. Id. § 3.6, at 209. 
312. Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).  
313. FARNSWORTH, supra note 310, § 3.6, at 209–10. 
314. CORBIN, supra note 295, § 1.9, at 26; see also P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in T.G. 
YOUDAN, EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 6 (1989) (explaining that reasonable expectations are 
a combination of actual expectations and “judicial prescription”). 
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Parties rarely specify their entire agreement in advance.315 Courts often 
are called upon to fill in missing terms, typically called “implied 
terms.”316 In deciding which terms to imply, courts might look to actual 
expectations of the parties even if not reduced to writing.317 But if the 
parties’ expectations were different, or nonexistent, a court will 
substitute an objective test, asking whether one party should have 
reasonably understood the other’s expectation. According to the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, when contracting parties omit an 
essential term, a court will supply a term that is “reasonable in the 
circumstances.”318 
Determining reasonable expectations requires looking at basic 
principles to guide a court when moving from situations the parties 
anticipated to situations they did not. The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts instructs a court to supply a term that “comports with 
community standards of fairness and policy.”319 The difficult question is 
determining which principles to use in making the determination of what 
is fair or reasonable. If justice is served by enforcing a result where both 
parties did not expect or intend the result, then something more than 
empirical expectations is required to give force to reasonable 
expectations. 
c. Normative Expectations Are a Further Basis for Determining 
Reasonable Expectations 
Normative rules or principles are necessary to give substance to the 
otherwise vague notion of reasonableness where neither the contract nor 
actual expectations can sufficiently ground reasonable expectations. Let 
us explore what is meant by a normative rule or principle that might 
ground expectations. One can distinguish between expectations that a 
person has a good reason to have on the one hand, and expectations that 
a person has a right to have on the other, because of a rule or principle 
grounding that right.320 Consider expectations regarding traffic laws, for 
example. People do not have an empirical expectation that all motorists 
will follow traffic laws; it would be unreasonable to have such a starry-
                                                     
315. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the 
Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 30 (1990). 
316. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.16, at 483 (4th ed. 2004). 
317. Id. § 7.16, at 485. 
318. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981). 
319. Id. § 204 cmt. d.  
320. JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 280 (1992). 
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eyed view of one’s fellow drivers. Yet traffic laws give people 
normative grounds to expect motorists to follow the rules of the road. 
People have a normative expectation for compliance and act 
accordingly.321 
To strengthen the force of one’s expectation, one must rely on a rule 
or principle. Because broker-dealers have been advertising themselves as 
advisers, this inducement gives justificatory force to reasonable 
expectations by virtue of an express or implied promise.322 This Article 
does not argue that inducement through advertising or use of titles 
provides proof that a legal contract has formed between an investor and 
any particular brokerage firm. Rather, inducement provides normative 
support for reasonable expectations.323 Consider the agency law analogy 
in the doctrine of apparent authority discussed above.324 For apparent 
authority to exist, the third party must reasonably believe the agent has 
authority to act on behalf of the principal and the belief must be 
traceable to the principal’s manifestations, analogous to an 
inducement.325 Moreover, one should view brokers’ inducement in the 
context of changes in the financial services industry discussed above,326 
whereby advice has advanced and execution has receded in importance. 
In that respect, advertisements are part of a broader picture that has 
given rise to expectations that were not present in previous decades. The 
next section explores inducement in more detail. 
                                                     
321. Id. 
322. Mitchell, supra note 249, at 656. 
323. Once one articulates a normative basis to support reasonable expectations, the original 
notion of expectations recedes in importance. Articulating an independent principle to ground 
expectations moves one away from the idea of expectations. A normative basis to support 
reasonable expectations points to the fact that individuals should have such expectations because 
there are good reasons for having them. If expectations depend on good reasons, and if the reasons 
articulated count as good reasons, then one can largely ignore the notion of reasonable expectations 
and ground an obligation on the reasons identified. COLEMAN, supra note 320, at 281; Mitchell, 
supra note 249, at 657. This shift is a common theme when articulating hypothetical constructs, 
such as hypothetical consent. The good reasons for grounding hypothetical consent are doing the 
real work for requiring action or inaction, and reference to consent is hardly necessary. SHELLY 
KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 90 (1998). 
324. See supra note 293–94 and accompanying text. 
325. See supra note 293 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 3.03 (explaining that the principal’s manifestation is the lynchpin of apparent agency). 
326. See supra Part I.D.3. 
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3. Advertisements Induce Customers to Engage Broker-Dealer Firms 
a. Advertisements Are Important to Customers 
Advertising advice and adviser titles induce individuals to contract 
with broker-dealers and ground a reasonable expectation that a broker-
dealer will provide advice. Advertising is the paid promotion of an idea, 
cause, product, or service by an identified sponsor attempting to inform 
and ultimately persuade a target audience into taking action.327 The 
advertising by many brokerage firms is sometimes referred to as 
institutional advertising because it takes a broad approach, emphasizing 
the philosophy of a particular industry, and is often meant to engender 
goodwill toward a product, service, or firm. Institutional advertising is 
similar to public relations because both attempt to promote a positive 
image.328 Advertising by broker-dealers can also take the form of 
persuasive advertising typically used after a product or service has been 
introduced to a customer. Persuasive advertising builds selective demand 
for a product or service by promoting its special feature.329 
Advertising is meant to reach specific customers at a particular time 
and induce them to change their behavior.330 The SEC has stated that 
regulating advertising is important because of the impact advertising has 
on retail investors.331 FINRA regulates brokerage firm advertising, 
which must be approved by a registered principal at the firm and, in 
some cases, filed with FINRA.332 Regulating advertising comprises an 
important aspect of FINRA’s program, which has a Department of 
Advertising Regulation dedicated to the task.333 
                                                     
327. Allen D. Truell & Michael Milbier, Advertising, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS AND 
FINANCE 15 (Burton S. Kaliski ed., 2d ed. 2007); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 6–7 (W. 
Davis Folsom ed., 2004). 
328. Truell & Milbier, supra note 327, at 17; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra 
note 327, at 6. 
329. Truell & Milbier, supra note 327, at 17. 
330. Id. Companies that advertise generally try to achieve one of several objectives, all of which 
are meant to encourage or induce the customer to make a purchase. The trial objective encourages 
customers to make an initial purchase of a product or service. The continuity objective is intended to 
retain current customers and build loyalty. Brand switching seeks to have a customer change from a 
competitor’s brand; non-dominant companies in a field often have this objective. The switchback 
objective seeks to regain lost customers by emphasizing new features or other important 
information. Id.; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 327, at 6. 
331. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 130. 
332. John R. Hewitt, Advertising and Communications, in BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 
§ 7:2.1, 76 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2011). 
333. Advertising regulation covers content standards, disclosure requirements, filing 
requirements, and review methods. See generally id. §§ 7.1–7.2, at 7-1 to 7-44. 
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Advertising works. According to research in the field of emotional 
advertising, one can develop positive beliefs about a subject’s attributes 
merely by having a positive emotional reaction to an advertisement.334 
Emotions such as “warmth” can relax the viewer and put him in a 
positive state of mind. Warmth can be stimulated by pictures or by 
narratives of friendship, caring, and tenderness.335 These feelings may be 
engendered through brokerage advertisements discussed above, 
particularly those suggesting that brokerage employees will provide 
trust, guidance, advice, answers, and help.336 Researchers have found 
that advertisements that evoke feelings of warmth are correlated with the 
likelihood of purchase.337 As discussed above, use of titles such as 
“financial advisor” and “financial consultant” appears to affect investors, 
with investors viewing financial advisors and financial consultants as 
more similar to investment advisers than to brokers in terms of the 
services offered and duties imposed.338 
b. Advertisements Are Intended to Be Believed 
One response to the argument that advertising and titles induce 
customers to engage a particular brokerage firm is that advertising 
language is not meant to be taken literally; the language is mere 
puffery.339 Under the puffery doctrine, words such as “trust,” “advice,” 
and “trusted advice” are not meant to be believed as actually true. For 
example, no one would think that the phrase “best cheesesteaks in 
Philadelphia” is the result of a proprietor’s survey. Instead, the phrase is 
mere puffery. 
Puffery is a spurious objection here. First, it is unlikely that the 
brokerage industry would argue that use of advertisements proposing 
advice, and titles such as “financial advisor” or “financial consultant,” 
                                                     
334. Julie A. Edell, Emotion in Advertising: A Timely Union, in EMOTION IN ADVERTISING: 
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL EXPLORATIONS xiv (Stuart J. Agres et al. eds., 1990). 
335. GERARD J. TELLIS, EFFECTIVE ADVERTISING: UNDERSTANDING WHEN, HOW, AND WHY 
ADVERTISING WORKS 171 (2004). 
336. Some financial services firms employ language of trust in their advertisements to create a 
particular mood, image, or emotion. Similarly, by differentiating “answers” from “sales talk,” which 
was done in one of the advertisements mentioned above, see supra Part III.A., brokers shed their 
historical role as securities salesmen and promoted an image that they provide impartial advice. See 
supra Part III.A.; see also supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
337. See David A. Aaker et al., Warmth in Advertising: Measurement, Impact, and Sequence 
Effects, 12 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 365, 378 (1986). 
338. See supra Part III.A. 
339. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 606–09 (6th 
ed. 2009); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 723 (4th ed. 1971). 
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are acceptable expressly because no one would actually believe them at 
face value. Moreover, there is evidence that consumers consistently view 
puffery statements as important when making decisions.340 This 
evidence is consistent with the Rand Report, which suggests that people 
believe their brokers are acting in their best interest.341 
A second response is that even if the words in an advertisement are 
taken as true, the general rule is that an advertisement is not an offer.342 
There are two reasons for this rule. First, an advertisement is general; it 
is not clear to whom it is directed and there is no limitation on the 
number of persons who could accept it. Second, an advertisement is 
merely a notice of available goods or services and acts as an invitation to 
examine, negotiate, and buy.343 
Recent scholarship debunks the shibboleth that an advertisement is 
not an offer. Legal scholars Jay Feinman and Steven Brill point to three 
reasons why the rule is wrong: (i) the cases that cite this rule do not 
apply it, (ii) other legal rules, such as statutes and regulations, prevent 
application of the rule, and (iii) the rule is inconsistent with fundamental 
tenets of contract law.344 In light of this analysis, there are strong reasons 
to believe that advertisements in some cases might be considered offers. 
Regardless of whether or not an advertisement can be considered an 
offer, an advertisement under agency law could be considered a 
manifestation by a principal to a third party (a customer) that a broker-
dealer registered representative is acting in a fiduciary capacity, giving 
rise to reasonable expectations regarding the conduct of a broker-dealer 
firm. Again, the point is not that any one broker-dealer should be liable 
because of a particular advertisement or use of a title, but rather that 
broker-dealers that give advice should be subject to a general fiduciary 
duty because of the reasonable expectations they have created. 
C. Brokers’ Claim to Provide Advice Results in a Fiduciary Promise 
The argument to this point has been that use of advertisements and 
titles with advice language creates a reasonable expectation that broker-
                                                     
340. See David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1434–39 
(2006). 
341. RAND REPORT, supra note 84, at 109. 
342. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (1981) (“Advertisements of 
goods . . . are not ordinarily intended or understood as offers to sell.”); see also CORBIN, supra note 
295, § 2.4, at 116 (stating that it is not “customary” that an advertisement is an offer and the 
presumption is the other way). 
343. Feinman & Brill, supra note 298, at 63–64. 
344. Id. at 65–80. 
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dealer firms provide advice to retail customers. The provision of advice 
alone, however, may not give rise to a fiduciary duty. This section 
explains why a broker-dealer’s promise to advise another results in a 
promise to do so in an impartial manner, consistent with the other’s best 
interest—a fiduciary standard. 
1. Advising Another Implies Advising Impartially 
One might begin by asking what it means to “advise” another. To 
advise is to give guidance or suggestions, to state one’s opinion as to the 
best course of action, to counsel or make recommendations, typically as 
a basis for another to make a decision.345 A key element of this 
definition is to give guidance on the best course of action. Implicit in the 
term “advise” is that the guidance given will be the best guidance for the 
recipient of the advice, tantamount to a best interest standard. 
To clarify what is meant by “advise,” one might contrast it with the 
term “persuade,” which is to urge someone successfully to do 
something: to attract, induce, or entice in a particular direction.346 Both 
advising and persuading entail giving another reasons to undertake a 
particular course of action. An important difference, however, is that 
advising does not necessarily entail trying to convince another to change 
her conduct and follow a recommended course of action. To advise is to 
set forth a course of action for another. Even if the speaker believes the 
recipient should follow the course of action, the decision is left to the 
recipient and the speaker remains neutral.347 By contrast, persuasion 
connotes a speaker’s desire for a particular outcome. 
An adviser’s impartiality is implicit in the profession and the hallmark 
of adviser regulation. As discussed above, before the investment 
advisory profession developed, investors sought advice from their 
                                                     
345. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 271, available at http://www.oed.com/ 
view/Entry/3001?redirectedFrom=advise#eid. 
346. Id., available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/141561?rskey=clv4LK&result= 
2&isAdvanced=false#eid. 
347. The etymology of advice sheds light on the distinction. Advice can be traced to the French 
avis. The old French expression il m’est a vis meant “it is to me at sight” or “it is my view or 
opinion.” F. Max Müller, How to Work, 65 ECLECTIC MAG. OF FOREIGN LIT., SCI., & ART 433, 434 
(1897) (containing detailed etymology of advice). The French phrase ce m’est à vis became ce m’est 
avis meaning “it seems to me.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 271, available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/2987?redirectedFrom=advice#eid. Similarly, the phrase mon à vis, 
meaning “my at sight or my view,” became mon avis, and then, in the Latin of that time, advisum, 
derived from ad (to) and visum (seen), or the way in which a matter is seen or looked upon. Müller, 
supra, at 434. 
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lawyers and other professionals, not from specialists.348 In engaging with 
their lawyer, investors believed they were dealing with someone in 
whom they could confide their personal circumstances.349 The genesis of 
the profession was what Rudolf Berle, General Counsel of the 
Investment Counsel Association of America, called a “personal 
professional relationship.”350 Individuals turned to their investment 
adviser, like their lawyer, as someone they could trust to help them 
arrive at a solution to their problems. 
As described in Part I, a key concern underlying the Advisers Act was 
the presence of tipsters who were disguising themselves as legitimate 
advisers.351 There was antipathy by advisers who provided unbiased 
advice toward those with a vested interest in recommending a particular 
security.352 Leading up to passage of the Advisers Act, Berle lamented 
the fact that congressional bills that regulated investment companies and 
investment advisers appeared together. As he put it, “Investment counsel 
have only services to sell. Investment companies have securities to 
sell.”353 Implicit in this distinction was that investment counsel would 
advise in a client’s best interest whereas other securities professionals 
were trying to make a sale.354 
2. A Claim of Impartiality Results in a Fiduciary Duty 
When one advises another, he is purporting to provide independent, 
impartial information in the best interest of the recipient. This is 
common sense. When a student seeks enrollment advice from an 
academic counselor, the student has a reasonable expectation that the 
counselor will advise based on the student’s best interest and not on 
other considerations, such as which classes the school must fill or which 
                                                     
348. See supra Part I.A. 
349. Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 64, Part 2 at 750 (statement of Rudolf P. Berle, General 
Counsel, Investment Counsel Association of America). 
350. Id. 
351. See supra Part I.B.3. 
352. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
353. Berle, supra note 349, at 743. 
354. Developments in the European Union reflect this trend. The current draft of the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) states that investment firms should explain to clients 
the reasons for their advice. The draft also states that when providing investment advice on an 
independent basis, it is appropriate “to further restrict the possibility for firms to accept or receive 
inducements from third parties.” Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Markets in Financial Instruments Repealing Directive 2004.39.ec of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, at 27, COM (2011) 656 final (Oct. 20, 2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=200940. 
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professors the counselor likes best. According to William Prosser’s 
Handbook of The Law of Torts, it is reasonable to rely on an opinion that 
is given by one who purports to be disinterested.355 The propensity to 
rely on a disinterested adviser is illustrated by a venerable common law 
doctrine that distinguishes between advice given by a seller and advice 
given by one who holds himself out as disinterested. 
The rule of the disinterested adviser dates to the 1800s. In Medbury v. 
Watson,356 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that false 
statements by a seller of property might not be actionable because a 
buyer should be aware of a seller’s motive. A reasonable buyer would 
understand that a seller would be inclined towards hyperbole with regard 
to the property sold. By contrast, the same false statement made by a 
person purporting to be independent would result in liability: 
[T]he distinction between the two cases is marked and obvious. In 
the one, the buyer is aware of his position; he is dealing with the 
owner of the property, whose aim is to secure a good price, and 
whose interest it is to put a high estimate upon his estate, and 
whose great object is to induce the purchaser to make the 
purchase; while in the other, the man who makes the false 
assertions has apparently no object to gain; he stands in the 
situation of a disinterested person, in the light of a friend, who has 
no motive nor intention to depart from the truth, and who thus 
throws the vendee off his guard, and exposes him to be misled by 
the deceitful representations.357 
The Court distinguished a seller, whose role is transparent to the buyer 
and whose advice should be taken with a grain of salt, from another 
person who appears to be disinterested, which causes the buyer to let his 
guard down, exposing him to misrepresentations. 
Modern courts express a similar principle: an adviser that holds itself 
out as an expert assumes fiduciary obligations. In Burdett v. Miller,358 an 
unsophisticated investor, Burdett, formed a relationship with a 
stockbroker, Miller, who was also a certified public accountant, a 
professor of accounting, and the owner of his own accounting firm.359 
The two became friendly, occasionally having lunch and discussing 
business and personal matters. Burdett hired Miller to prepare her tax 
                                                     
355. PROSSER, supra note 339, at 727. 
356. 47 Mass. (6 Met.) 246 (1843). 
357. Id. at 260; see also Batchfelder v. Stephenson, 184 N.W. 852, 852–53 (Minn. 1921); Samp 
v. Long, 210 N.W. 733, 734–35 (S.D. 1926). 
358. 957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1992). 
359. Id. at 1378–79. 
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return and several years later sought his advice on how to invest to 
minimize her tax liability. Miller recommended that she invest in a 
number of tax shelters, but he failed to disclose conflicts of interest in 
making the recommendation and other relevant facts—such as the lack 
of an investment track record and the lack of liquidity. Burdett invested 
based on Miller’s advice and lost $200,000.360 Burdett sued, alleging that 
Miller, among other things, breached his fiduciary duty.361 
In Miller, Judge Richard Posner wrote that if a person solicits another 
to trust him in matters for which he holds himself out as expert and 
trustworthy, and if the other, who is not an expert, accepts the offer and 
reposes her trust in the first, a fiduciary relationship is established.362 
Thus, by holding oneself out as a disinterested adviser, a broker-dealer 
must act in the customer’s best interest, disclosing conflicts of interest 
and recommending the best investment among alternatives.363 
The claim of impartiality for advisers played an essential role in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence governing investment advisers, discussed 
above.364 In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., the Court held 
that a practice known as scalping—buying shares for the adviser’s own 
account and then recommending the same shares to clients—operated as 
a fraud and deceit on clients.365 The Court explained that when an 
adviser trades on the market effect of his own recommendation, he might 
be motivated to recommend the security to take advantage of a short-
term increase in price, and an investor should be permitted to evaluate an 
adviser’s “overlapping motivations.”366 The dissent in the Second Circuit 
                                                     
360. Id. at 1379. 
361. Id. 
362. Id. at 1381; see also EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 31 (N.Y. 2005) 
(holding that when an arm’s length relationship becomes advisory and one person was induced to 
and did repose confidence in another, the relationship becomes fiduciary). 
363. The holding-out argument is not the same as the shingle theory. See supra Part II.C.2. The 
shingle theory refers to the implicit statement by a broker, which hangs a shingle, that it will 
conduct business in an equitable and professional manner. See supra note 82 and accompanying 
text. The shingle theory holds that when a broker sells a security, it warrants that statements 
regarding the security are correct. The broker, therefore, has an obligation of due diligence to ensure 
its statements are correct. If the broker conceals information that is inconsistent with its statements, 
the concealment may be considered fraudulent. See HAZEN, supra note 30, at 608; Hazen, Are 
Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient? Principles, Rules, and Fiduciary Duties, supra note 19, 
at 751–52. The claim of reasonable expectations applies more expansively to the relationship 
between the broker and the customer than the shingle theory, establishing a reasonable expectation 
not only that the broker’s statements regarding a particular security are correct, but also that the 
broker will more generally act in the customer’s best interest.  
364. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
365. Id. at 181. 
366. Id. at 196. 
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Court of Appeals, which presaged the majority decision in the Supreme 
Court, focused on the appearance of objectivity and the importance such 
appearance would have to an investor: 
Here Capital Gains held itself out as an investment adviser and 
stated that the service was exclusively designed to help clients 
protect investment capital, realize income, and accumulate capital 
gains. It thus naturally instilled in its clients the belief that it 
would render impartial and unbiased expert advice. Having taken 
this fiduciary stance, it then secretly engaged in profitable trading 
operations often inconsistent with its own advice . . . . Failure to 
disclose the existence of such a motive in the light of the implicit 
and explicit guaranty of impartiality was a scheme to defraud and 
operated as a fraud upon the clients.367 
The Supreme Court majority adopted this theme, noting that affiliations 
by advisory firms with banks or corporations might preclude a 
“disinterested, objective, or critical” perspective regarding an 
investment.368 
Recalling that the Advisers Act was meant to address “tipster” firms 
masquerading as bona fide investment advisers illustrates that Congress 
and the SEC have returned to where they started in 1940. The Advisers 
Act was passed out of concern that certain individuals or firms were 
masquerading as advisers without providing impartial advice. Today, the 
same tension animates the debate over whether to impose a fiduciary 
duty on brokers that give advice. Absent a fiduciary duty for brokers that 
give advice, the concern remains that brokers that are paid to sell 
securities, or that have other conflicts of interest, are masquerading as 
objective investment advisers, even though they are not regulated as 
such.369 As one expert stated when testifying in support of a fiduciary 
standard, “the key characteristic that distinguishes advice from a sales 
pitch is that it is designed with the recipient’s interest in mind.”370 
D. Regulatory and Common Law Consequences Follow from 
Investors’ Reasonable Expectations of a Fiduciary Obligation 
The use of advertising and titles laden with the language of advice has 
                                                     
367. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606, 617 (2d Cir. 1962) (Clark, J., 
dissenting). 
368. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 187–88 (quoting H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477, 29 (1939)). 
369. See Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Conflict Seen In Sales Tactic at JPMorgan, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, at A1. 
370. Roper, supra note 177, at 6. 
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consequences in both regulatory law and common law. The regulatory 
consequence is that customers’ reasonable expectations that brokers act 
in a fiduciary capacity can form the basis for a new fiduciary rule for 
broker-dealers under Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The common 
law consequence is that courts can look to the reasonable expectations of 
investors in determining whether broker-dealers that give personalized 
advice to retail customers should be held to a fiduciary standard. 
1. Reasonable Expectations Support a New Fiduciary Duty Under the 
Dodd-Frank Act 
In the Section 913 Study, the SEC staff’s primary recommendation is 
that the Commission “should engage in rulemaking to implement the 
uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-dealers and investment 
advisers when providing personalized investment advice about securities 
to retail customers.”371 According to the Study, a uniform standard 
should require that all brokers, dealers, and advisers, when providing 
personalized advice, “act in the best interest of the customer without 
regard to the financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, or 
investment adviser providing the advice.”372 Insofar as brokers advertise 
themselves as advisers, thereby inducing customers to use their services, 
brokers are raising reasonable expectations that they will act in a 
fiduciary capacity. Moreover, brokers’ advertisements focus on giving 
personalized advice, which was Congress’ precise concern in Section 
913 of the Dodd-Frank Act. As a result, regulators have a basis for 
imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers that give advice. 
Under this analysis, brokers would still be excluded from the 
Advisers Act if their advice was solely incidental to brokerage and they 
did not charge special compensation for advice. Broker-dealers that give 
personalized advice to retail customers will not be subject to the 
Advisers Act in its entirety. The SEC would maintain discretion to 
determine when advice is so significant that it cannot be considered 
solely incidental to brokerage. 
One example of where advice would probably not be solely incidental 
to brokerage is when a broker has discretion over an account. When the 
SEC adopted the exemptive rule in 2005, it determined that discretionary 
advice could no longer be considered “solely incidental” to brokerage. 
Broker-dealers would not be excluded from the Advisers Act for 
discretionary accounts, regardless of the form of compensation received. 
                                                     
371. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 1, at 109. 
372. Id. at 109–10. 
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According to the SEC, authority to effect a trade without consulting a 
client is “qualitatively distinct” from providing advice that is “solely 
incidental” to brokerage. The SEC explained that when a broker has 
discretion, the broker is both the source of the advice and the person 
with the authority to carry it out. This type of activity is “quintessentially 
supervisory or managerial” and warrants protections provided by the 
Advisers Act.373 Decisions such as these would be left to the SEC to 
resolve through rulemaking, interpretation, and enforcement cases. 
Under a new rule, however, an overarching fiduciary obligation would 
apply across the board to broker-dealers that provide personalized advice 
to retail customers. 
2. Reasonable Expectations Support a Common Law Fiduciary Duty 
for Broker-Dealers That Provide Advice 
This Article argues that brokers’ use of advertisements and titles, 
which induces customers to obtain advice from brokerage firms, along 
with changes in the brokerage industry, creates a reasonable expectation 
that brokers providing advice are fiduciaries and must act in customers’ 
best interest. This in itself creates a legal basis for holding broker-dealers 
to a fiduciary standard when those brokers provide advice. As a result, if 
an action were brought by a brokerage customer against a firm for 
breach of fiduciary duty in the context of a broker providing advice, a 
court could hold that the brokerage firm has breached its fiduciary duty 
resulting in a tort. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a 
person in a fiduciary relationship with another is subject to liability for 
harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the relation.374 In the 
context of a broker providing advice, a fiduciary relationship exists and 
the duty is imposed by the relation. That is, the duty arises because of 
the inducement from the broker’s use of advertising and titles. If harm 
has occurred as a result of a breach, the broker would be subject to 
liability in tort. 
This rule should apply to the category of brokers that provide 
personalized advice to retail customers. This category of brokers would 
join the group of paradigmatic relationships, such as trustee and 
beneficiary, guardian and ward, and attorney and client, all of which are 
already subject to a fiduciary obligation.375 Courts would no longer have 
                                                     
373. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 20,440. 
374. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979). 
375. See Finn, supra note 314, at 32; Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 
665, 671–72 (2009). 
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to engage in a case-by case determination regarding whether a broker-
dealer that provides advice is a fiduciary. 
To say that a court should hold that a fiduciary duty exists and that a 
breach of the duty would constitute a tort does not settle what the scope 
or contours of the broker’s fiduciary obligation would be. As noted 
above, fiduciary duties are ambiguous and the details of the broker’s 
fiduciary duty are open to question.376 The duties imposed in a particular 
case would likely vary depending on the contract between the brokerage 
firm and the customer and other circumstances surrounding the 
relationship. A fiduciary’s obligations typically depend on the scope of 
the fiduciary’s authority.377 The scope of this authority can vary, even 
within a particular brokerage firm. For example, some accounts are 
discretionary; others are not.378 Regardless of the particular contours of 
the fiduciary obligation, the standard obligations attendant to a fiduciary 
relationship would follow: the broker, for example, could not use the 
customer’s property, the broker’s position, or any non-public 
information acquired as a result of the relationship for the broker’s own 
purposes.379 The broker would owe a fiduciary duty to the customer and 
breach would constitute a tort. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Whether a fiduciary relationship is imposed by administrative rule or 
common law, one feature of the fiduciary relationship that cannot be 
ignored is the ability of the parties in the relationship to change their 
rights and responsibilities by contract.380 Although the parties can alter 
many obligations attendant to a fiduciary relationship, certain 
obligations—such as a core duty of loyalty—cannot be negotiated.381 A 
strict duty of loyalty to place the customer’s interest before the firm’s 
                                                     
376. See supra Part II.A.2. 
377. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (2006). 
378. See supra Part III.D.1. 
379. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e. 
380. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90–91 (1989). 
381. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(2) (2007) (“Even an express 
authorization [to engage in prohibited transactions], however, would not completely dispense with 
the trustee’s underlying fiduciary obligations to act in the interest of the beneficiaries and to 
exercise prudence in administering the trust.”); see also BT-I v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of 
the U.S., 75 Cal. App. 4th 1406, 1412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A] limited partnership agreement 
cannot relieve the general partner of its fiduciary duties in matters fundamentally related to the 
partnership business.”). 
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interest would be etched in the law, whether by rule or case law. Perhaps 
more importantly, in the large number of instances when the parties do 
not revise terms by contract, default rules governing fiduciary 
relationships, developed through centuries of precedent in the common 
law, would be applicable to the brokerage relationship.382 
CONCLUSION 
As the SEC edges closer to imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers that 
give advice, it can look to investors’ reasonable expectations as a 
justification for doing so. The debate over whether and when to impose a 
fiduciary duty on brokers is not new. It has existed in the courts for 
decades and took on new dimensions once brokers began to market 
themselves as advisers, particularly after the abolition of fixed 
commissions. Charging asset-based fees and the development of two 
tiers of pricing for brokerage services raised questions over whether 
brokers could continue to rely on the broker exclusion from the Advisers 
Act. Although the SEC attempted to address this conundrum through 
rulemaking, the SEC’s rule was vacated. And although Congress took up 
the issue in the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress made no final decisions, 
opting to delegate resolution of this thorny problem to the SEC. The 
SEC staff has recommended imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers that 
give advice, but the SEC has yet to act. 
To date, the justifications relied on by those proposing a fiduciary 
duty for brokers are not completely convincing. Arguments such as 
investor confusion or inconsistent or weak standards are insufficient to 
ground a change in the law. Confusion could be addressed by 
mechanisms short of a rule change, and the presence of inconsistent or 
even weak standards alone does not justify changing them. A better 
reason stems from investors’ expectations, though a fiduciary standard is 
not supportable based on the empirical expectations of some or even 
most investors. 
To support a fiduciary duty for brokers, regulators and courts should 
look instead to the reasonable expectations of brokerage customers, 
formed over years of advertising and use of titles, which project an 
image of a broker as a trusted adviser and provide a promise of 
rendering advisory services. Inherent in a promise to provide advice is a 
promise that the advice will be objective and shorn of conflicts of 
interest—the hallmarks of advice given by investment advisers in 
                                                     
382. Cf. Andrew Tuch, Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest, 29 
MELB. U. L. REV. 478, 503 (2005). 
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accordance with a fiduciary standard as articulated by the SEC and the 
courts. The reasonable expectations of the parties, resulting from 
brokers’ use of advertising and titles reflecting an advisory role, provide 
a sound justification to change the law to impose on broker-dealers a 
fiduciary duty when providing personalized investment advice to retail 
customers. The SEC should exercise its authority and impose a fiduciary 
duty in this circumstance. 
 
